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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH ; 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
BONNIE LEE REYNOLDS ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
) Case No. 20060404-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court committed plain error in concluding that Reynolds' vehicle 
was subject to a security interest, as required for a conviction of defrauding creditors, as 
provided by Utah code Annotated § 76-6-511. The underlying issue presents a question 
of statutory interpretation, which is reviewed by this court for correctness. State v. 
Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995). The issue was not preserved with specificity and 
should be reviewed for plain error, which requires that Appellant establish an obvious 
and prejudicial error made by the trial court. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 
(Utah 1993) (Aplt. Br. at 1). 
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda of the Appellee's 
Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Reynolds appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the Honorable 
G. Rand Beacham, Fifth District Court, after she was convicted of defrauding creditors, a 
class A misdemeanor, and criminal trespass, an infraction. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Reynolds was charged by Information filed in Fifth District Court on August 8, 
2005, with defrauding creditors, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-6-511; and criminal trespass, an infraction in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-6-206(2)(b) (R. 1-2). 
On January 19, 2006, a bench trial was held before Judge Beacham (R. 29-30, 75). 
At the close of the evidence, the trial court found Reynolds guilty on both charges (R. 75: 
64-67). 
On March 30, 2006, Reynolds was sentenced to the statutory maximums. 
However, the sentences were suspended and Reynolds was placed on court probation for 
24 months; and she was ordered to commit no violations of law and to pay restitution in 
the amount of $1,414.43, plus interest (R. 51-52, 77). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
2 
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Larry and Jennifer Porter are owners of Auto Tech Systems, which is an auto 
repair business (75: 5, 66). Reynolds owned a 1990 Isuzu Trooper ("the vehicle") (75; 
50-51). Reynolds authorized Auto Tech Systems to repair the head gasket of the vehicle, 
estimated to be under $1,000 (R. 75: 52). Auto Tech Systems completed the repair on the 
vehicle (R. 75: 8, 52, 66). Reynolds tried to negotiate a payment arrangement with the 
Porters, rather than pay the full repair cost, in order to get Auto Tech Systems to release 
the vehicle (R. 75: 6, 18, 66). Ms. Reynolds failed to make an acceptable payment 
arrangement with the Porters (R. 75: 19, 53-54, 66). The bill for the repairs on the 
vehicle was not paid for at the time it was removed from Auto Tech Systems (R. 75: 40-
41, 66). The vehicle was on the property of Auto Tech Systems, which was enclosed by 
an unlocked fence and gate (R. 75: 23, 26, 56, 65). Reynolds removed the vehicle from 
Auto Tech Systems' Property (R. 75: 56, 65-66). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State of Utah asserts that the trial court was correct in convicting Reynolds of 
defrauding creditors, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-511, because the Porters 
had a security interest in Reynolds' vehicle that was created or attached at the time the 
repairs were completed. Reynolds removed the vehicle from the Porters' property 
without paying for the repairs, with intent to hinder the Porters' ability to perfect or 
enforce their security interest. 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
I. The trial Court was correct in concluding that Reynolds5 vehicle was 
subject to a security interest, as required for conviction of defrauding 
creditors, as defined in Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-511, because the 
repairman's lien statute is an exception to Article 9 of Utah's Uniform 
Commercial Code; the repairman's lien itself created a security interest. 
The trial court convicted Reynolds of defrauding creditors, a class A misdemeanor (R. 
75: 67). The court found that the Porters had a security interest in the vehicle because a 
repairman's lien was created when Auto Tech Systems completed repairs, as requested 
by Reynolds (Id). The court found that when Ms. Reynolds removed the vehicle she 
intended to hinder the enforcement of that security interest (Id). The court stated that the 
Porters' "possession is the only way that the lien is asserted and maintained, and Ms. 
Reynolds certainly intended to hinder Mr. Porter's possession of the vehicle" (Id). 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-511(1) provides that a person is guilty of, defrauding 
creditors, a class A misdemeanor, if "he destroys, removes, conceals, encumbers, 
transfers, or otherwise deals with property subject to a security interest with a purpose to 
hinder enforcement of that interest..." 
Utah Code Annotated § 38-2-3 defines repairman's lien as, "[ejvery person who 
shall make, alter or repair, or bestow labor upon, any article of personal property at the 
request of the owner or other person entitled to possession thereof shall have a lien upon 
such article for the reasonable value of the labor performed and materials furnished and 
used in making such article or in altering or repairing the same, and may retain 
possession thereof until the amount so due is paid...." 
4 
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Reynolds admits that the Porters had a repairman's lien on the vehicle, but 
maintains that the repairman's lien was not an enforceable security interest (Aplt. Br. 12-
13). Reynolds asserts that it was plain error for the trial court to convict her of 
defrauding creditors, under Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-511, without the existence of an 
enforceable security interest {Id). 
Reynolds is mistaken in her application of the secured transaction provisions in 
Article 9 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code ("the UCC") as applied to a repairman's 
lien (Aplt. Br. at 12-13). Reynolds argues that because the conditions required by § 70 A-
9a-203 were not completed when the vehicle was repaired, a security interest was not 
created (Aplt. Br. at 13). Reynolds fails to recognize that Article 9 provides an exception 
for a repairman's lien. The proper analysis to determine whether a security interest is 
created when a repairman's lien attaches to property, is to apply the repairman's lien 
statute and other related statutes, in conjunction with the exceptions of Article 9. 
One of the purposes of the UCC is to simplify, clarify and modernize the law 
governing commercial transactions. U.C.A. 70A-1-102. Section 70A-9a-109(l)(a) of the 
UCC states that "[ejxcept as otherwise provided in Subsections (3) and (4), this chapter 
applies to a transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in personal 
property or fixtures by contract. See also, In re Curtis, 345 B.R. 756 at 761, (Bankr. 
D.Utah, 2006), 60 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 395. 
Subsection (4)(b) provides a specific exception for a repairman's lien. The 
exception states, "[t]his chapter does not apply to a lien, other than an agricultural lien, 
given by statute or other rule of law for services or materials, but § 70A-9a-333 applies 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
with respect to priority of the lien". The State of Utah asserts that a repairman's lien is a 
lien created by state statute, for services; therefore, is outside the scope of Article 9 of the 
UCC, except for the priority provisions. 
When interpreting statutes, this Court should "read the plain language of the 
statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same 
chapter and related chapters." Foutz v. City of South Jordan, UT 2004 75, ^ J11, 100 P.3d 
1171. It appears that the legislature intended only § 333 of Article 9, the priority 
provisions, to apply to a repairman's lien. 
The other Articles of the UCC are also applicable to a repairman's lien; in this 
case, the definition sections apply. Section 70A-l-201(37)(a) provides the definition of 
security interest as "an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or 
performance of an obligation. The Comments to § 70A-9a-109 state, "[a]s to which 
transactions give rise to a 'security interest', the definition of that term in § 1-201 must be 
consulted. When a security interest is created, this Article applies regardless of the form 
of the transaction or the name that parties have given to it."1 Under this definition, the 
State of Utah agrees with Reynolds that a repairman's lien qualifies as a security interest 
(Aplt.Br. at 12-13). 
The repairman's lien statute provides the methods necessary for creation or 
attachment of a repairman's lien, and when read in conjunction with the UCC, defines a 
1
 "Although Utah did not adopt the comments to the UCC when it enacted the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code, Utah courts have cited the comments for guidance in 
interpreting provisions of the Code." Mead Copr. v. Dixon Paper Co., 1185 n. 9, 907 
P.2dll97. 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
repairman's lien as a security interest. U.C.A. also provides for perfection (see U.C.A. § 
38-2-4), enforcement (Id.), and priority provisions (see U.C.A. §§ 70A-9a-333 and 38-2-
3) for a repairman's lien. However, this Court does not need to decide if the security 
interest that was created by the repairman's lien was perfected, enforceable, or what 
priority it has with regards to other secured parties. The only issue for the Court to 
decide is whether a repairman's lien is a security interest. 
The State of Utah asserts the Porters had a security interest in the vehicle, that was 
created when Ms. Reynolds requested repairs and Mr. Porter completed those repairs. 
Reynolds did not pay for the repairs, and she removed the vehicle from the Porters' 
property with the intent to hinder their ability to perfect or enforce their security interest. 
Reynolds has not established that an obvious and prejudicial error was made by the trial 
court. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993) (Aplt. Br. at 1). 
Also, this court need not address Reynolds' assertion that because she did not 
authorize all the repairs that were made on her vehicle, a repairman's lien was not created 
(Aplt. Br. at 14). As stated above, a repairman's lien attached to the vehicle and a 
security interest was created when the Porters completed the repairs to the vehicle, as 
originally requested. The "second stage" of repairs was not an issue for the trial court, 
and is not an issue in this appeal (R:75 66). This Court should affirm the trial courts 
finding that the security interest was "in existence due to the repairs having been 
done... .[t]here.. .was work that had been authorized and had been done with no issue 
about it" (R. 75: 66). Reynolds did not pay for the repairs, and she removed the vehicle 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
from the Porters' property with the intent to hinder their ability to perfect or enforce their 
security interest in violation of U.C.A. § 76-6-511(1). 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
The State of Utah requests that this Court affirm Reynolds' conviction for 
defrauding creditors, a class A misdemeanor, because the evidence was sufficient to 
establish an security interest as required by U.C.A. § 76-6-511. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 1 ^ day of March, 2007. 
Rachelle S. Ehlert 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
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Westlaw 
U T S T § 3 8 - 2 - 3 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 3 8 - 2 - 3 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 38. Liens 
*£ Chapter 2. Miscellaneous Liens 
-•§ 38-2-3. Repairman's lien on personal property--Lien subject to rights of 
secured parties 
Every person who shall make, alter or repair, or bestow labor upon, any article of 
personal property at the request of the owner or other person entitled to 
possession thereof shall have a lien upon such article for the reasonable value of 
the labor performed and materials furnished and used in making such article or in 
altering or repairing the same, and may retain possession thereof until the amount 
so due is paid; provided such lien and right to possession shall be subject and 
subordinate to the rights and interests of any secured parties in such personal 
property unless such secured party has requested such person to make, alter or 
repair or bestow labor upon such property. 
Laws 1965, c. 74, § 1; Laws 1977, c. 272, § 48. 
Codifications R.S. 1898, § 1404; C.L. 1907, § 1404; C.L. 1917, § 3773; R.S. 
1933, § 52-2-3; C. 1943, § 52-2-3. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Aircraft Lien Act, scope, see § 38-13-103. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Automobiles €^>373. 
Bailment €=^18 . 
Secured Transactions €^144. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 50kl8; 48Ak373; 349Akl44. 
C.J.S. Bailments §§ 75, 80. 
C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 1627 to 1677. 
C.J.S. Secured Transactions §§ 90, 100. 
RESEARCH REFERENCES 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
3 Causes of Action 2d 807, Cause of Action to Establish or Enforce Artisan's or 
Repairer's Lien. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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UT ST § 38-2-3 Page 2 
U.C.A. 1953 § 38-2-3 
Damages 3 
Election of remedies 7 
Garage keepers, repairmen, and filling stations 2 
Priority of lien 4 
Rescission of contract 5 
Review 8 
Waiver 6 
Warehousemen 1 
1. Warehousemen 
A warehouseman's lien may be foreclosed in an equitable action. Howard v. J.P. 
Paulson Co., 1912, 41 Utah 490, 127 P. 284. Warehousemen €^> 33 
A warehouseman's lien may be enforced to the extent of the amount found due, by 
way of counterclaim in a replevin action to recover the property. Howard v. J.P. 
Paulson Co., 1912, 41 Utah 490, 127 P. 284. Warehousemen €^ => 33 
2. Garage keepers, repairmen, and filling stations 
Owner of tractor was excused from requirement that he tender amount to satisfy 
repair bill to have dealer release tractor, since dealer refused to release 
tractor unless owner tendered amount due on open account in addition to repair 
bill. Jenkins v. Equipment Center, Inc., 1994, 869 P.2d 1000, certiorari denied 
879 P.2d 266. Automobiles €=^ 378 
Remedy of garage keeper for recovery of storage charges on impounded automobile 
was against officer and not against car owner. Rickenberg v. Capitol Garage, 
1926, 68 Utah 30, 249 P. 121, 50 A.L.R. 1303. Automobiles € ^ 371 
Garage keeper had no lien for storage on impounded automobile where police 
unconditionally surrendered claim check to car owner. Rickenberg v. Capitol 
Garage, 1926, 68 Utah 30, 249 P. 121, 50 A.L.R. 1303. Automobiles €=> 374 
Comp. Laws 190 7, § 14 04, provides that any person who shall repair or bestow labor 
on any personal property at the request of the owner shall have a lien thereon for 
his labor and for any materials furnished in making such repair. Held that, where 
plaintiff's agent took plaintiff's automobile to a garage for repairs, believing 
that the repairs would be made by S., but the repairs were made by defendant, S. 
testifying that he had no interest therein, the implied contract to pay defendant 
for the repairs was sufficient to sustain defendant's lien; no express contract 
for the repairs being necessary. Westminster Inv. Co. v. McCurtain, 1911, 3 9 Utah 
544, 118 P. 564. Automobiles €==> 375 
3. Damages 
In action in which dealer had converted owner's tractor, trial court's subsidiary 
findings were inadequate to support its ultimate finding that monthly rental value 
of tractor would be $1,500, for purposes of damages, given expert's testimony 
regarding commercial rental rates for comparable tractors, owner's actual usage of 
tractor, and owner's actions to compensate for deprivation of tractor. Jenkins v. 
2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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UT ST § 38-2-3 Page 3 
U.C.A. 1953 § 38-2-3 
Equipment Center, Inc., 1994, 869 P. 2d 1000, certiorari denied 879 P. 2d 266. 
Trover And Conversion €=^ 6 8 
Measure of damages against garage keeper for wrongfully withholding plaintiff's 
car was reasonable value of use of car. Rickenberg v. Capitol Garage, 1926, 68 
Utah 30, 249 P. 121, 50 A.L.R. 1303. Replevin €=> 76 
4. Priority of lien 
Creditor's right to repairman's lien for maintenance and repair work that it had 
performed prepetition on Chapter 7 debtor's aircraft was governed not by general 
Utah statute governing repairman's liens on personal property, but by Utah's 
Aircraft Lien Act, under which creditor's right to lien depended on filing of its 
lien with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) within 90 days of last date on 
which work was performed; absent any such filing, creditor was not entitled to 
repairman's lien in aircraft. In re Utah Aircraft Alliance, 2006, 2006 WL 689527, 
withdrawn and superseded on denial of rehearing 342 B.R. 327. Aviation €=^ 244 
Repairman's lien was superior to secured party's claim to the property where 
evidence established that secured party requested that repairs be made to tractors 
and trailer, by virtue of letter authorizing such repairs when repairman inquired 
of secured party as to its wishes after owner declared bankruptcy and repairman 
learned of the security interest. U.C.A.1953, § 38-2-3. Gunnison Valley Bank v. 
Madsen, 1984, 685 P.2d 543. Secured Transactions €^> 144 
5. Rescission of contract 
On rescission of contract for construction of trailer, defendant was entitled to 
recover payment made by him on contract and value of parts furnished by him and 
which had become part of trailer. Sidney Stevens Implement Co. v. Hintze, 193 7, 
92 Utah 264, 67 P.2d 632, 111 A.L.R. 331. Contracts € ^ 274 
6. Waiver 
Generally, tender must be made of amount actually due; but if demand of larger 
sum is so made that it amounts to announcement that it is useless to tender 
smaller sum, it dispenses with any tender and amounts to waiver of lien. Jenkins 
v. Equipment Center, Inc., 1994, 869 P.2d 1000, certiorari denied 879 P.2d 266. 
Liens €^> 16; Tender €=> 12(2); Tender €==> 16(3) 
7. Election of remedies 
Under Comp. Laws, 1907, §§ 1403, 1405, 1406, 3851, 3858, a warehouseman, by 
presenting a claim against an estate for storage charges and, on its rejection, 
suing the estate to recover the amount of the claim without asserting a 
warehouseman's lien in either case, held not to have made an election of remedies 
so as to prevent the assertion of such lien by way of counterclaim in a subsequent 
action by the executors to replevin the property. Howard v. J. P. Paulson Co., 
1912, 41 Utah 490, 127 P. 284. Election Of Remedies €=> 7(3) 
8. Review 
® 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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UT ST § 38-2-3 Page 4 
U.C.A. 1953 § 38-2-3 
Under Comp. Laws 1907, §§ 2968, 2969, providing that an answer may contain a 
statement of any new matter constituting a defense or counterclaim, and defining a 
counterclaim, where plaintiff brought replevin for an automobile and defendant 
denied plaintiff's right to possession, claiming a lien for repairs, the case 
thereby became an equitable one, so that on appeal the Supreme Court could make 
findings in accordance with the evidence and direct what judgment should be 
entered, or might remand the cause with directions to make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in accordance with its directions. Westminster Inv. Co. v. 
McCurtain, 1911, 39 Utah 544, 118 P. 564. Appeal And Error €^ => 847(1) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 38-2-3, UT ST § 38-2-3 
Current through end of 2 006 legislation 
Copr ® 2 007 Thomson/West 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Westlaw 
U T S T § 3 8 - 2 - 4 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 3 8 - 2 - 4 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 38. Liens 
*ii Chapter 2. Miscellaneous Liens 
-•§ 38-2-4. Disposal of property by lienholder--Procedure 
(1) Any party holding a lien upon personal property as provided in this chapter 
may dispose of the property in the manner provided in Subsection (2). 
(2) (a) The lienor shall give notice to the owner of the property, to the customer 
as indicated on the work order, and to all other persons claiming an interest in 
or lien on it, as disclosed by the records of the Motor Vehicle Division, 
lieutenant governor's office, or of corresponding agencies of any other state in 
which the property appears registered or an interest in or lien on it is evidenced 
if known by the lienor. 
(b) The notice shall be sent by certified mail at least 3 0 days before the 
proposed or scheduled date of any sale and shall contain: 
(i) a description of the property and its location; 
(ii) the name and address of the owner of the property, the customer as 
indicated on the work order, and any person claiming an interest in or lien on 
the property; 
(iii) the name, address, and telephone number of the lienor; 
(iv) notice that the lienor claims a lien on the property for labor and 
services performed and interest and storage fees charged, if any, and the cash 
sum which, if paid to the lienor, would be sufficient to redeem the property 
from the lien claimed by the lienor; 
(v) notice that the lien claimed by the lienor is subject to enforcement under 
this section and that the property may be sold to satisfy the lien; 
(vi) the date, time, and location of any proposed or scheduled sale of the 
property and whether the sale is private or public, except that no property may 
be sold earlier than 45 days after completion of the repair work; and 
(vii) notice that the owner of the property has a right to recover possession 
of the property without instituting judicial proceedings by posting bond. 
(3) If the owner of the property is unknown or his whereabouts cannot be 
determined, or if the owner or any person notified under Subsection (2) fails to 
acknowledge receipt of the notice, the lienor, at least 20 days before the 
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proposed or scheduled date of sale of the property, shall publish the notice 
required by this section once in a newspaper circulated in the county where the 
vehicle is held. 
(4) A lienee may have his property released from any lien claimed on it under this 
chapter by filing with the clerk of a justice court or district court a cash or 
surety bond, payable to the person claiming the lien, and conditioned for the 
payment of any judgment that may be recovered on the lien, with costs, interest, 
and storage fees. 
(5) (a) The lienor has 60 days after receiving notice that the lienee has filed the 
bond provided in Subsection (4) to file suit to foreclose his lien. 
(b) If the lienor fails to timely file an action, the clerk of the court shall 
release the bond. 
(6) Property subject to lien enforcement under this section may be sold by the 
lienor at public or private sale; however, in the case of a private sale, every 
aspect of the sale, including the method, manner, time, place, and terms shall be 
commercially reasonable. 
(7) This section may not be construed to affect an owner's right to redeem his 
property from the lien at any time prior to sale by paying the amount claimed by 
the lienor for work done, interest, and storage fees charged and any costs 
incurred by the repair shop for using enforcement procedures under this section. 
Laws 1981, c. 172, § 1; Laws 1992, c. 1, § 5; Laws 1996, c. 198, § 18, ef f. July 
1, 1996. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Aircraft Lien Act, scope, see § 38-13-103. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Automobiles € ^ 3 7 3 . 
Bailment €^>i8. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 50kl8; 4 8Ak3 73. 
C.J.S. Bailments §§ 75, 80. 
C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 1627 to 1677. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
Notice of sale 1 
Sale of property by receiver 2 
Warehousemen's lien 3 
1. Notice of sale 
Notice, mailed to nonresident creditors, who had listed their claims with railroad 
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company's receiver, and published in newspaper once weekly for six consecutive 
weeks before receiver's sale of company's property, was reasonable notice for 
service by publication. Rev.St.1933, 13-0-7 to 13-0-10, 52-2-4, 102- 9-1, 
102-14-1, 102-14-2. Chapman v. Schiller, 1938, 95 Utah 514, 83 P.2d 249, 120 
A.L.R. 906. Receivers €^> 134 
2. Sale of property by receiver 
Ordinarily, only debtor's equity is sold at receiver's sale of his property, which 
is sold subject to liens. Chapman v. Schiller, 1938, 95 Utah 514, 83 P.2d 249, 
120 A.L.R. 906. Receivers € ^ 135 
Property may be sold free of liens by receiver, where lienholders are parties to 
proceedings. Chapman v. Schiller, 1938, 95 Utah 514, 83 P.2d 249, 120 A.L.R. 906. 
Receivers €^ => 135 
3. Warehousemen's lien 
A warehouseman's lien may be foreclosed in an equitable action. Howard v. J.P. 
Paulson Co., 1912, 41 Utah 490, 127 P. 284. Warehousemen €=> 33 
U.C.A. 1953 § 38-2-4, UT ST § 38-2-4 
Current through end of 2006 legislation 
Copr ® 2 007 Thomson/West 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 70A. Uniform Commercial Code (Refs & Annos) 
*® Chapter 1. General Provisions 
*ii Part 1. Short Title, Construction, Application and Subject Matter of the 
Act 
-•§ 70A-1-102. Purposes--Rules of construction--Variation by agreement 
(1) This act [FN1] shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its 
underlying purposes and policies. 
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this act are 
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions; 
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, 
usage and agreement of the parties; 
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions. 
(3) The effect of provisions of this act may be varied by agreement, except as 
otherwise provided in this act and except that the obligations of good faith, 
diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this act may not be disclaimed by 
agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the 
performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not 
manifestly unreasonable. 
(4) The presence in certain provisions of this act of the words "unless otherwise 
agreed" or words of similar import does not imply that the effect of other 
provisions may not be varied by agreement under Subsection (3). 
(5) In this act unless the context otherwise requires 
(a) words in the singular number include the plural, and in the plural include 
the singular; 
(b) words of the masculine gender include the feminine and the neuter, and when 
the sense so indicates words of the neuter gender may refer to any gender. 
Laws 1965, c. 154, § 1-102. 
[FN1] Laws 1965, c. 154 enacted provisions comprising Title 70A, the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENT 
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<For UCC acknowledgments, see UT ST UCC Acknowledgments^ 
Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: Section 74, Uniform Sales Act; Section 57, 
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act; Section 52, Uniform Bills of Lading Act; Section 
19, Uniform Stock Transfer Act; Section 18, Uniform Trust Receipts Act. 
Changes: Rephrased and new material added. 
Purposes of Changes: 
1. Subsections (1) and (2) are intended to make it clear that: 
This Act is drawn to provide flexibility so that, since it is intended to be a 
semi-permanent piece of legislation, it will provide its own machinery for 
expansion of commercial practices. It is intended to make it possible for the law 
embodied in this Act to be developed by the courts in the light of unforeseen and 
new circumstances and practices. However, the proper construction of the Act 
requires that its interpretation and application be limited to its reason. 
Courts have been careful to keep broad acts from being hampered in their effects 
by later acts of limited scope. Pacific Wool Growers v. Draper & Co., 158 Or. 1, 
73 P.2d 1391 (1937), and compare Section 1-104. They have recognized the policies 
embodied in an act as applicable in reason to subject-matter which was not 
expressly included in the language of the act, Commercial Nat. Bank of New Orleans 
v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 239 U.S. 520, 36 S.Ct. 194, 60 L.Ed. 417 
(1916) (bona fide purchase policy of Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act extended to 
case not covered but of equivalent nature) . They have done the same where reason 
and policy so required, even where the subject-matter had been intentionally 
excluded from the act in general. Agar v. Orda, 264 N.Y. 248, 190 N.E. 479 (1934) 
(Uniform Sales Act change in seller's remedies applied to contract for sale of 
choses in action even though the general coverage of that Act was intentionally 
limited to goods "other than things in action.") They have implemented a 
statutory policy with liberal and useful remedies not provided in the statutory 
text. They have disregarded a statutory limitation of remedy where the reason of 
the limitation did not apply. Fiterman v. J. N. Johnson & Co., 156 Minn. 201, 194 
N.W. 399 (1923) (requirement of return of the goods as a condition to rescission 
for breach of warranty; also, partial rescission allowed). Nothing in this Act 
stands in the way of the continuance of such action by the courts. 
The Act should be construed in accordance with its underlying purposes and 
policies. The text of each section should be read in the light of the purpose and 
policy of the rule or principle in question, as also of the Act as a whole, and 
the application of the language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the 
case may be, in conformity with the purposes and policies involved. 
2. Subsection (3) states affirmatively at the outset that freedom of contract is a 
principle of the Code: "the effect" of its provisions may be varied by 
"agreement." The meaning of the statute itself must be found in its text, 
including its definitions, and in appropriate extrinsic aids; it cannot be varied 
by agreement. But the Code seeks to avoid the type of interference with 
evolutionary growth found in Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E. 594 
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(1926). Thus private parties cannot make an instrument negotiable within the 
meaning of Article 3 except as provided in Section 3-104; nor can they change the 
meaning of such terms as "bona fide purchaser," "holder in due course," or "due 
negotiation," as used in this Act. But an agreement can change the legal 
consequences which would otherwise flow from the provisions of the Act. 
"Agreement" here includes the effect given to course of dealing, usage of trade 
and course of performance by Sections 1-201, 1-205 and 2-208; the effect of an 
agreement on the rights of third parties is left to specific provisions of this 
Act and to supplementary principles applicable under the next section. The rights 
of third parties under Section 9-317 when a security interest is unperfected, for 
example, cannot be destroyed by a clause in the security agreement. 
This principle of freedom of contract is subject to specific exceptions found 
elsewhere in the Act and to the general exception stated here. The specific 
exceptions vary in explicitness: the statute of frauds found in Section 2-201, 
for example, does not explicitly preclude oral waiver of the requirement of a 
writing, but a fair reading denies enforcement to such a waiver as part of the 
"contract" made unenforceable; Section 9-602, on the other hand, is quite 
explicit. Under the exception for "the obligations of good faith, diligence, 
reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act," provisions of the Act prescribing 
such obligations are not to be disclaimed. However, the section also recognizes 
the prevailing practice of having agreements set forth standards by which due 
diligence is measured and explicitly provides that, in the absence of a showing 
that the standards manifestly are unreasonable, the agreement controls. In this 
connection, Section 1-205 incorporating into the agreement prior course of dealing 
and usages of trade is of particular importance. 
3. Subsection (4) is intended to make it clear that, as a matter of drafting, 
words such as "unless otherwise agreed" have been used to avoid controversy as to 
whether the subject matter of a particular section does or does not fall within 
the exceptions to subsection (3) , but absence of such words contains no negative 
implication since under subsection (3) the general and residual rule is that the 
effect of all provisions of the Act may be varied by agreement. 
4. Subsection (5) is modelled on 1 U.S.C. Section 1 and New York General 
Construction Law Sections 22 and 35. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Statutes in derogation of common law liberally construed, see § 68-3-2. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Statutes €==>179, 226. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 361kl79; 361k226. 
C.J.S. Statutes §§ 309, 358 to 361. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
In general 1 
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Guaranty agreements 3 
Transfer of title between parties 2 
1. In general 
The Uniform Sales Act will be construed in accordance with the construction placed 
thereon by the court of last resort of any state in which the act is in force, in 
view of Comp. Laws 1917, § 5183, providing that the act shall be so interpreted as 
to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which 
enact it. Stewart v. Hansen, 1923, 62 Utah 281, 218 P. 959, 44 A.L.R. 340. 
Statutes €^ => 226 
2. Transfer of title between parties 
Determination regarding whether title to personal property was actually 
transferred, for purpose of determining whether subsequent leaseback transaction 
was subject to sales tax, was not governed by Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) ; 
contract itself superseded UCC by stating that title passed on closing date from 
vendor to purchaser. U.C.A.1953, 70A-1-102 (3) ; U.C.A.1953, 59-12-103 (1) (k) (2000) 
. Matrix Funding Corp. v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 2002, 52 P.3d 1282, 454 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 42, 2002 UT 85, rehearing denied. Sales €^> 199; Taxation €=> 3644 
3. Guaranty agreements 
Consent provision in guaranty agreements, which provided that liability of 
guarantors was not to be affected by release or surrender of any security held for 
payment of debts, specifically modified reasonable care standard of statute 
requiring secured party to use reasonable care in custody and preservation of 
collateral in his possession [U.C.A. 1953, § 70A-9-207] and was not manifestly 
unreasonable; thus alleged failure to observe standards of commercial 
reasonableness did not release guarantors from liability. U.C.C. § 9-207 comment. 
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Utah Sec. Mortg., Inc., 1985, 701 P. 2d 1095. 
Guaranty €^? 72 
U.C.A. 1953 § 70A-1-102, UT ST § 70A-1-102 
Current through end of 2006 legislation 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 70A. Uniform Commercial Code (Refs & Annos) 
Til Chapter 9A. Uniform Commercial Code--Secured Transactions (Refs & Annos) 
Ti Part 1. General Provisions (Refs & Annos) 
-• § 70A-9a-109. Scope 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Subsections (3) and (4), this chapter applies 
to: 
(a) a transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in 
personal property or fixtures by contract; 
(b) an agricultural lien; 
(c) a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes; 
(d) a consignment; 
(e) a security interest arising under Section 70A-2-401 or 70A-2-505 or 
Subsection 70A-2-711(3) or 70A-2a-508(5), as provided in Section 70A-9a- 110; and 
(f) a security interest arising under Section 70A-4-210 or 70A-5-118. 
(2) The application of this chapter to a security interest in a secured obligation 
is not affected by the fact that the obligation is itself secured by a transaction 
or interest to which this chapter does not apply. 
(3) This chapter does not apply to the extent that: 
(a) a statute, regulation, or treaty of the United States preempts this chapter; 
(b) another statute of this state expressly governs the creation, perfection, 
priority, or enforcement of a security interest created by this state or a 
governmental unit of this state; 
(c) a statute of another state, a foreign country, or a governmental unit of 
another state or a foreign country, other than a statute generally applicable to 
security interests, expressly governs creation, perfection, priority, or 
enforcement of a security interest created by the state, country, or governmental 
unit; or 
(d) the rights of a transferee beneficiary or nominated person under a letter of 
credit are independent and superior under Section 70A-5-114. 
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(4) This chapter does not apply to: 
(a) a landlord's lien, other than an agricultural lien; 
(b) a lien, other than an agricultural lien, given by statute or other rule of 
law for services or materials, but Section 70A-9a-333 applies with respect to 
priority of the lien; 
(c) an assignment of a claim for wages, salary, or other compensation of an 
employee; 
(d) a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes 
as part of a sale of the business out of which they arose; 
(e) an assignment of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory 
notes which is for the purpose of collection only; 
(f) an assignment of a right to payment under a contract to an assignee that is 
also obligated to perform under the contract; 
(g) an assignment of a single account, payment intangible, or promissory note to 
an assignee in full or partial satisfaction of a preexisting indebtedness; 
(h) a transfer of an interest in or an assignment of a claim under a policy of 
insurance, other than an assignment by or to a health-care provider of a 
health-care-insurance receivable and any subsequent assignment of the right to 
payment, but Sections 70A-9a-315 and 70A-9a-322 apply with respect to proceeds 
and priorities in proceeds; 
(i) an assignment of a right represented by a judgment, other than a judgment 
taken on a right to payment that was collateral; 
(j) a right of recoupment or set-off, but: 
(i) Section 70A-9a-340 applies with respect to the effectiveness of rights of 
recoupment or set-off against deposit accounts; and 
(ii) Section 70A-9a-404 applies with respect to defenses or claims of an 
account debtor; 
(k) the creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real property, 
including a lease or rents thereunder, except to the extent that provision is 
made for: 
(i) liens on real property in Sections 70A-9a-203 and 70A-9a-308; 
(ii) fixtures in Section 70A-9a-334; 
(iii) fixture filings in Sections 70A-9a-501, 70A-9a-502, 70A-9a-512, 
70A-9a-516, and 70A-9a-519; and 
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(iv) security agreements covering personal and real property in Section 
70A-9a-604; 
(1) an assignment of a claim arising in tort, other than a commercial tort claim, 
but Sections 70A-9a-315 and 70A-9a-322 apply with respect to proceeds and 
priorities in proceeds; 
(m) an assignment of a deposit account in a consumer transaction, but Sections 
70A-9a-315 and 70A-9a-322 apply with respect to proceeds and priorities in 
proceeds; 
(n) an assignment of a claim or right to receive compensation for injuries or 
sickness as described in 26 U.S.C. 104(a)(1) or (2); or 
(o) an assignment of a claim or right to receive benefits under a special needs 
trust as described in 42 U.S.C. 1396p(d)(4). 
(5) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this section, Subsections (4) (n) 
and (o) shall only be effective to security interests created on or after May 6, 
2002. 
Laws 2000, c. 252, § 49, eff. July 1, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 99, § 1, ef f. May 6, 
2002. 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENT 
<For UCC acknowledgments, see UT ST UCC Acknowledgments^ 
1. Source. Former Sections 9-102, 9-104. 
2. Basic Scope Provision. Subsection (a)(1) derives from former Section 9- 102(1) 
and (2). These subsections have been combined and shortened. No change in 
meaning is intended. Under subsection (a) (1) , all consensual security interests 
in personal property and fixtures are covered by this Article, except for 
transactions excluded by subsections (c) and (d) . As to which transactions give 
rise to a "security interest," the definition of that term in Section 1- 201 must 
be consulted. When a security interest is created, this Article applies 
regardless of the form of the transaction or the name that parties have given to 
it. 
3. Agricultural Liens. Subsection (a)(2) is new. It expands the scope of this 
Article to cover agricultural liens, as defined in Section 9-102. 
4. Sales of Accounts, Chattel Paper, Payment Intangibles, Promissory Notes, and 
Other Receivables. Under subsection (a)(3), as under former Section 9-102, this 
Article applies to sales of accounts and chattel paper. This approach generally 
has been successful in avoiding difficult problems of distinguishing between 
transactions in which a receivable secures an obligation and those in which the 
receivable has been sold outright. In many commercial financing transactions the 
distinction is blurred. 
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Subsection (a) (3) expands the scope of this Article by including the sale of a 
"payment intangible" (defined in Section 9-102 as "a general intangible under 
which the account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation") and a 
"promissory note" (also defined in Section 9-102). To a considerable extent, this 
Article affords these transactions treatment identical to that given sales of 
accounts and chattel paper. In some respects, however, sales of payment 
intangibles and promissory notes are treated differently from sales of other 
receivables. See, e.g., Sections 9-309 (automatic perfection upon attachment), 
9-408 (effect of restrictions on assignment). By virtue of the expanded 
definition of "account" (defined in Section 9-102), this Article now covers sales 
of (and other security interests in) "health-care-insurance receivables" (also 
defined in Section 9-102). Although this Article occasionally distinguishes 
between outright sales of receivables and sales that secure an obligation, neither 
this Article nor the definition of "security interest" (Section 1-201(37)) 
delineates how a particular transaction is to be classified. That issue is left 
to the courts. 
5. Transfer of Ownership in Sales of Receivables. A "sale" of an account, chattel 
paper, a promissory note, or a payment intangible includes a sale of a right in 
the receivable, such as a sale of a participation interest. The term also 
includes the sale of an enforcement right. For example, a "[p]erson entitled to 
enforce" a negotiable promissory note (Section 3-301) may sell its ownership 
rights in the instrument. See Section 3-203, Comment 1 ("Ownership rights in 
instruments may be determined by principles of the law of property, independent of 
Article 3, which do not depend upon whether the instrument was transferred under 
Section 3-203."). Also, the right under Section 3-309 to enforce a lost, 
destroyed, or stolen negotiable promissory note may be sold to a purchaser who 
could enforce that right by causing the seller to provide the proof required under 
that section. This Article rejects decisions reaching a contrary result, e.g., 
Dennis Joslin Co. v. Robinson Broadcasting, 977 F.Supp. 4 91 (D.D.C.1997). 
Nothing in this section or any other provision of Article 9 prevents the transfer 
of full and complete ownership of an account, chattel paper, an instrument, or a 
payment intangible in a transaction of sale. However, as mentioned in Comment 4, 
neither this Article nor the definition of "security interest" in Section 1-201 
provides rules for distinguishing sales transactions from those that create a 
security interest securing an obligation. This Article applies to both types of 
transactions. The principal effect of this coverage is to apply this Article's 
perfection and priority rules to these sales transactions. Use of terminology 
such as "security interest," "debtor," and "collateral" is merely a drafting 
convention adopted to reach this end, and its use has no relevance to 
distinguishing sales from other transactions. See PEB Commentary No. 14. 
Following a debtor's outright sale and transfer of ownership of a receivable, the 
debtor-seller retains no legal or equitable rights in the receivable that has been 
sold. See Section 9-318(a). This is so whether or not the buyer's security 
interest is perfected. (A security interest arising from the sale of a promissory 
note or payment intangible is perfected upon attachment without further action. 
See Section 9-309.) However, if the buyer's interest in accounts or chattel paper 
is unperfected, a subsequent lien creditor, perfected secured party, or qualified 
buyer can reach the sold receivable and achieve priority over (or take free of) 
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the buyer's unperfected security interest under Section 9-317. This is so not 
because the seller of a receivable retains rights in the property sold; it does 
not. Nor is this so because the seller of a receivable is a "debtor" and the 
buyer of a receivable is a "secured party" under this Article (they are) . It is 
so for the simple reason that Sections 9-318 (b) , 9-317, and 9-322 make it so, as 
did former Sections 9-301 and 9-312. Because the buyer's security interest is 
unperfected, for purposes of determining the rights of creditors of and purchasers 
for value from the debtor-seller, under Section 9-318(b) the debtor-seller is 
deemed to have the rights and title it sold. Section 9-317 subjects the buyer's 
unperfected interest in accounts and chattel paper to that of the debtor-seller's 
lien creditor and other persons who qualify under that section. 
6. Consignments. Subsection (a)(4) is new. This Article applies to every 
"consignment." The term, defined in Section 9-102, includes many but not all 
"true" consignments (i.e., bailments for the purpose of sale). If a transaction 
is a "sale or return," as defined in revised Section 2-326, it is not a 
"consignment." In a "sale or return" transaction, the buyer becomes the owner of 
the goods, and the seller may obtain an enforceable security interest in the goods 
only by satisfying the requirements of Section 9-203. 
Under common law, creditors of a bailee were unable to reach the interest of the 
bailor (in the case of a consignment, the consignor-owner). Like former Section 
2-326 and former Article 9, this Article changes the common-law result; however, 
it does so in a different manner. For purposes of determining the rights and 
interests of third-party creditors of, and purchasers of the goods from, the 
consignee, but not for other purposes, such as remedies of the consignor, the 
consignee is deemed to acquire under this Article whatever rights and title the 
consignor had or had power to transfer. See Section 9-319. The interest of a 
consignor is defined to be a security interest under revised Section 1-201(37), 
more specifically, a purchase-money security interest in the consignee's 
inventory. See Section 9-103(d). Thus, the rules pertaining to lien creditors, 
buyers, and attachment, perfection, and priority of competing security interests 
apply to consigned goods. The relationship between the consignor and consignee is 
left to other law. Consignors also have no duties under Part 6. See Section 
9-601(g). 
Sometimes parties characterize transactions that secure an obligation (other than 
the bailee's obligation to returned bailed goods) as "consignments." These 
transactions are not "consignments" as contemplated by Section 9- 109(a)(4). See 
Section 9-102. This Article applies also to these transactions, by virtue of 
Section 9-109(a)(l). They create a security interest within the meaning of the 
first sentence of Section 1-201(37). 
This Article does not apply to bailments for sale that fall outside the definition 
of "consignment" in Section 9-102 and that do not create a security interest that 
secures an obligation. 
7. Security Interest in Obligation Secured by Non-Article 9 Transaction. 
Subsection (b) is unchanged in substance from former Section 9-102(3). The 
following example provides an illustration. 
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Example 1: 0 borrows $10,000 from M and secures its repayment obligation, 
evidenced by a promissory note, by granting to M a mortgage on O's land. This 
Article does not apply to the creation of the real-property mortgage. However, if 
M sells the promissory note to X or gives a security interest in the note to 
secure M's own obligation to X, this Article applies to the security interest 
thereby created in favor of X. The security interest in the promissory note is 
covered by this Article even though the note is secured by a real-property 
mortgage. Also, X's security interest in the note gives X an attached security 
interest in the mortgage lien that secures the note and, if the security interest 
in the note is perfected, the security interest in the mortgage lien likewise is 
perfected. See Sections 9-203, 9-308. 
It also follows from subsection (b) that an attempt to obtain or perfect a 
security interest in a secured obligation by complying with non-Article 9 law, as 
by an assignment of record of a real-property mortgage, would be ineffective. 
Finally, it is implicit from subsection (b) that one cannot obtain a security 
interest in a lien, such as a mortgage on real property, that is not also coupled 
with an equally effective security interest in the secured obligation. This 
Article rejects cases such as In re Maryville Savings & Loan Corp., 743 F.2d 413 
(6th Cir.1984), clarified on reconsideration, 760 F.2d 119 (1985). 
8. Federal Preemption. Former Section 9-104(a) excluded from Article 9 "a security 
interest subject to any statute of the United States, to the extent that such 
statute governs the rights of parties to and third parties affected by 
transactions in particular types of property." Some (erroneously) read the former 
section to suggest that Article 9 sometimes deferred to federal law even when 
federal law did not preempt Article 9. Subsection (c)(1) recognizes explicitly 
that this Article defers to federal law only when and to the extent that it 
must-i.e., when federal law preempts it. 
9. Governmental Debtors. Former Section 9-104(e) excluded transfers by 
governmental debtors. It has been revised and replaced by the exclusions in new 
paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (c) . These paragraphs reflect the view that 
Article 9 should apply to security interests created by a State, foreign country, 
or a "governmental unit" (defined in Section 9-102) of either except to the extent 
that another statute governs the issue in question. Under paragraph (2) , this 
Article defers to all statutes of the forum State. (A forum cannot determine 
whether it should consult the choice-of-law rules in the forum's UCC unless it 
first determines that its UCC applies to the transaction before it.) Paragraph 
(3) defers to statutes of another State or a foreign country only to the extent 
that those statutes contain rules applicable specifically to security interests 
created by the governmental unit in question. 
Example 2: A New Jersey state commission creates a security interest in favor of 
a New York bank. The validity of the security interest is litigated in New York. 
The relevant security agreement provides that it is governed by New York law. To 
the extent that a New Jersey statute contains rules peculiar to creation of 
security interests by governmental units generally, to creation of security 
interests by state commissions, or to creation of security interests by this 
particular state commission, then that law will govern. On the other hand, to the 
extent that New Jersey law provides that security interests created by 
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governmental units, state commissions, or this state commission are governed by 
the law generally applicable to secured transactions (i.e., New Jersey's Article 
9), then New York's Article 9 will govern. 
Example 3: An airline that is an instrumentality of a foreign country creates a 
security interest in favor of a New York bank. The analysis used in the previous 
example would apply here. That is, if the matter is litigated in New York, New 
York law would govern except to the extent that the foreign country enacted a 
statute applicable to security interests created by governmental units generally 
or by the airline specifically. 
The fact that New York law applies does not necessarily mean that perfection is 
accomplished by filing in New York. Rather, it means that the court should apply 
New York's Article 9, including its choice-of-law provisions. Under New York's 
Section 9-301, perfection is governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the 
debtor is located. Section 9-307 determines the debtor's location for 
choice-of-law purposes. 
If a transaction does not bear an appropriate relation to the forum State, then 
that State's Article 9 will not apply, regardless of whether the transaction would 
be excluded by paragraph (3). 
Example 4: A Belgian governmental unit grants a security interest in its 
equipment to a Swiss secured party. The equipment is located in Belgium. A 
dispute arises and, for some reason, an action is brought in a New Mexico state 
court. Inasmuch as the transaction bears no "appropriate relation" to New Mexico, 
New Mexico's UCC, including its Article 9, is inapplicable. See Section 1-105(1). 
New Mexico's Section 9-109(c) on excluded transactions should not come into play. 
Even if the parties agreed that New Mexico law would govern, the parties' 
agreement would not be effective because the transaction does not bear a 
"reasonable relation" to New Mexico. See Section 1-105(1). 
Conversely, Article 9 will come into play only if the litigation arises in a UCC 
jurisdiction or if a foreign choice-of-law rule leads a foreign court to apply the 
law of a UCC jurisdiction. For example, if issues concerning a security interest 
granted by a foreign airline to a New York bank are litigated overseas, the court 
may be bound to apply the law of the debtor's jurisdiction and not New York's 
Article 9. 
10. Certain Statutory and Common-Law Liens; Interests in Real Property. With few 
exceptions (nonconsensual agricultural liens being one), this Article applies only 
to consensual security interests in personal property. Following former Section 
9-104(b) and (j), paragraphs (1) and (11) of subsection (d) exclude landlord's 
liens and leases and most other interests in or liens on real property. These 
exclusions generally reiterate the limitations on coverage (i.e., "by contract," 
"in personal property and fixtures") made explicit in subsection (a)(1). 
Similarly, most jurisdictions provide special liens to suppliers of many types of 
services and materials, either by statute or by common law. With the exception of 
agricultural liens, it is not necessary for this Article to provide general 
codification of this lien structure, which is determined in large part by local 
conditions and which is far removed from ordinary commercial financing. As under 
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former Section 9- 104(c), subsection (d)(2) excludes these suppliers' liens (other 
than agricultural liens) from this Article. However, Section 9-333 provides a 
rule for determining priorities between certain possessory suppliers' liens and 
security interests covered by this Article. 
11. Wage and Similar Claims. As under former Section 9-104(d), subsection (d)(3) 
excludes assignments of claims for wages and the like from this Article. These 
assignments present important social issues that other law addresses. The Federal 
Trade Commission has ruled that, with some exceptions, the taking of an assignment 
of wages or other earnings is an unfair act or practice under the Federal Trade 
Commission Act. See 16 C.F.R. Part 444. State statutes also may regulate such 
assignments. 
12. Certain Sales and Assignments of Receivables; Judgments. In general this 
Article covers security interests in (including sales of) accounts, chattel paper, 
payment intangibles, and promissory notes. Paragraphs (4), (5), (6), and (7) of 
subsection (d) exclude from the Article certain sales and assignments of 
receivables that, by their nature, do not concern commercial financing 
transactions. These paragraphs add to the exclusions in former Section 9-104(f) 
analogous sales and assignments of payment intangibles and promissory notes. For 
similar reasons, subsection (d)(9) retains the exclusion of assignments of 
judgments under former Section 9-104(h) (other than judgments taken on a right to 
payment that itself was collateral under this Article). 
13. Insurance. Subsection (d)(8) narrows somewhat the broad exclusion of interests 
in insurance policies under former Section 9-104(g). This Article now covers 
assignments by or to a health-care provider of "health-care-insurance receivables" 
(defined in Section 9-102). 
14. Set-Off. Subsection (d) (10) adds two exceptions to the general exclusion of 
set-off rights from Article 9 under former Section 9-104 (i). The first takes 
account of new Section 9-340, which regulates the effectiveness oE a set-off 
against a deposit account that stands as collateral. The second recognizes 
Section 9-404, which affords the obligor on an account, chattel paper, or general 
intangible the right to raise claims and defenses against an assignee (secured 
party). 
15. Tort Claims. Subsection (d)(12) narrows somewhat the broad exclusion of 
transfers of tort claims under former Section 9-104(k). This Article now applies 
to assignments of "commercial tort claims" (defined in Section 9-102) as well as 
to security interests in tort claims that constitute proceeds of other collateral 
(e.g., a right to payment for negligent destruction of the debtor's inventory). 
Note that once a claim arising in tort has been settled and reduced to a 
contractual obligation to pay, the right to payment becomes a payment intangible 
and ceases to be a claim arising in tort. 
This Article contains two special rules governing creation of a security interest 
in tort claims. First, a description of collateral in a security agreement as 
"all tort claims" is insufficient to meet the requirement for attachment. See 
Section 9-108(e). Second, no security interest attaches under an after-acquired 
property clause to a tort claim. See Section 9-204(b). In addition, this Article 
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does not determine whom the tortfeasor must pay to discharge its obligation. 
Inasmuch as a tortfeasor is not an "account debtor," the rules governing waiver of 
defenses and discharge of an obligation by an obligor (Sections 9-403, 9-404, 
9-405, and 9-406) are inapplicable to tort-claim collateral. 
16. Deposit Accounts. Except in consumer transactions, deposit accounts may be 
taken as original collateral under this Article. Under former Section 9- 104(1), 
deposit accounts were excluded as original collateral, leaving security interests 
in deposit accounts to be governed by the common law. The common law is 
nonuniform, often difficult to discover and comprehend, and frequently costly to 
implement. As a consequence, debtors who wished to use deposit accounts as 
collateral sometimes were precluded from doing so as a practical matter. By 
excluding deposit accounts from the Article's scope as original collateral in 
consumer transactions, subsection (d) (13) leaves those transactions to law other 
than this Article. However, in both consumer and non-consumer transactions, 
sections 9-315 and 9-322 apply to deposit accounts as proceeds and with respect to 
priorities in proceeds. 
This Article contains several safeguards to protect debtors against inadvertently 
encumbering deposit accounts and to reduce the likelihood that a secured party 
will realize a windfall from a debtor's deposit accounts. For example, because 
"deposit account" is a separate type of collateral, a security agreement covering 
general intangibles will not adequately describe deposit accounts. Rather, a 
security agreement must reasonably identify the deposit accounts that are the 
subject of a security interest, e.g., by using the term "deposit accounts." See 
Section 9-108. To perfect a security interest in a deposit account as original 
collateral, a secured party (other than the bank with which the deposit account is 
maintained) must obtain "control" of the account either by obtaining the bank's 
authenticated agreement or by becoming the bank's customer with respect to the 
deposit account. See Sections 9- 312(b)(1), 9-104. Either of these steps 
requires the debtor's consent. 
This Article also contains new rules that determine which State's law governs 
perfection and priority of a security interest in a deposit account (Section 9-
304) , priority of conflicting security interests in and set-off rights against a 
deposit account (Sections 9-327, 9-340), the rights of transferees of funds from 
an encumbered deposit account (Section 9-332), the obligations of the bank 
(Section 9-341), enforcement of security interests in a deposit account (Section 
9-607 (c) ) , and the duty of a secured party to terminate control of a deposit 
account (Section 9-208(b)). 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2002, c. 99, added subsecs. (4)(n), (4)(o) and (5) 
Prior Laws: 
Laws 1977, c. 272. 
Laws 1996, c. 172, § 1. 
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Laws 1997, c. 241, § 23. 
C. 1953, §§ 70A-9-102, 70A-9-104. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Choice of law, power of parties, see § 70A-1-105, 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Secured Transactions €=^>3.1 to 7. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 349Ak3.1 to 349Ak7. 
C.J.S. Secured Transactions §§ 2 to 3, 6. 
RESEARCH REFERENCES 
Forms 
6B Am. Jur. Pi. & Pr. Forms UCC Article 9 § 9:5, Statutory References. 
6B Am. Jur. PI. & Pr. Forms UCC Article 9 § 9:22, Statutory References. 
UCC Legal Forms § 9:55, Statutory References. 
U.C.C. Pleading and Practice Forms § 9:7, Statutory References. 
U.C.C. Pleading and Practice Forms § 9:17, Statutory References. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
Leases 1 
Loan transactions 2 
Motor vehicles 3 
1. Leases 
Vending machine agreement, whether characterized as lease or sale, was secured 
transaction; consideration vending machine "lessee" was to pay vending machine 
"lessor" for right to possession and use of machines was obligation for term of 
lease not subject to termination by lessee, and lessee had option to become owner 
of vending machines for nominal additional consideration. U.C.A.1953, 
70A-1-20K37) (b) , 70A-9-102 (1) (a) . McMahan v. Dees, 1994, 873 P.2d 1172. Secured 
Transactions €^ => 41 
Contractual agreement between rental car business and company which provided 
automobiles was true lease, and not security agreement which would have been 
within coverage of Uniform Commercial Code, where there was no dispositive 
indication on face of document that parties intended to execute security 
agreement, and agreement contained no option to purchase, no provision for 
transfer of ownership of vehicles to car rental business and specifically provided 
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for retention of title in lessor. U.C.A.1953, 70A-1-201 (37), 70A-9-102 (1) (a) . 
LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 1991, 805 P.2d 189. Secured Transactions €=> io 
In determining nature of agreement purporting to be true lease, courts must look 
behind form of agreement to determine whether it is, in fact, sales agreement with 
reservation of security interest in vendor; however, when interpreting court 
finds no dispositive evidence that parties intended agreement to be other than 
that what it purports to be by its unambiguous terms, courts should decline to 
construe agreement contrary to those terms. U.C.A.1953, 70A-1-201(37), 
70A-9-102(1) (a) . LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 1991, 805 P.2d 189. Secured 
Transactions €^> io 
Determination of whether agreement is lease or secured sales agreement is question 
of law when analysis is based upon a language of agreement itself and not upon 
extrinsic evidence. LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 1991, 805 P.2d 189. Secured 
Transactions € ^ 10 
If contract is true lease agreement, fundamental principles of contract law apply 
and liability for damages is established merely by showing breach of agreement's 
provisions; if agreement is security agreement subject to Uniform Commercial 
Code, commercial reasonableness of disposition of collateral is prerequisite to 
bringing deficiency action. U.C.A.1953, 70A-1-201(37), 70A-9-102(1)(a), 
70A-9-504 (3) . LMV Leasing, Inc. v. Conlin, 1991, 805 P.2d 189. Bailment €=> 20; 
Secured Transactions € ^ 10 
Under provisions of Uniform Commercial Code governing scope of article on secured 
transactions, if transaction in form of lease of personal property is actually 
intended to be sale, reserving in "lessor" security interest, such lease falls 
under ambit of the article. U.C.A.1953, 70A-1-201(37), 70A-9-102. FMA Financial 
Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 1979, 590 P.2d 803. Secured Transactions €^> io 
Question whether lease of personal property is intended for security must be 
determined by facts of each case; nevertheless, if such lease is accompanied by 
option to purchase and "nominal" consideration was exchanged for the option, such 
lease is one intended for security. U.C.A.1953, 70A-1-201 (37), 70A-9-102. FMA 
Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 1979, 590 P.2d 803. Secured Transactions € ^ 10 
To determine whether purchase price under personal property lease option is 
"nominal consideration" which makes lease one intended for security, court may 
compare the option price with original list price or cost of the property, or may 
compare the option price with "sensible alternatives," or may compare the option 
price to fair market value of property at time option is to be exercised. 
U.C.A.1953, 70A-1-20K37), 70A-9-102. FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 1979, 
590 P.2d 803. Secured Transactions €^> io 
Test for determining whether purchase price under lease option is "nominal 
consideration" making lease one intended for security, which test compares option 
price to fair market value of equipment at time option is to be exercised, was 
most relevant in determining whether option price of printing equipment as 
provided in personal property lease was "nominal." U.C.A.1953, 70A-1-201(37), 
70A-9-102. FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 1979, 590 P.2d 803. Secured 
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Where option under lease to purchase printing equipment could be exercised for 10% 
of original cost to lessor and only 6% of total lease payments, option price was 
"nominal," and lease was intended for security and was subject to provisions of 
Uniform Commercial Code article governing secured transactions. U.C.A.1953, 
70A-1-20M37) , 70A-9-101 et seq., 70A-9-102. FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 
1979, 590 P.2d 803. Secured Transactions €=> io 
Where lessor's officers admitted in action brought for deficiency judgment 
following default on lease and sale of printing equipment that they offered 
lessees opportunity to purchase leased equipment as matter of course in their 
business, integration clause in the lease, which did not mention such option, was 
rendered ineffective to exclude parol evidence of existence of such option. FMA 
Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 1979, 590 P.2d 803. Secured Transactions €=? 25 
2. Loan transactions 
Utah's Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) applied to loan transactions in which 
documents executed with respect to original loan clearly evidenced lender's intent 
to create security interest, although on their face none of the documents 
associated with three successive loans indicated creation of security interest in 
property except for showing pledge from borrowers' account with lender in amount 
of $50; U.C.C. specifically provides that its provisions apply to any transaction 
intended to create security interest regardless of its form. U.C.A.1953, 
31A-22-412(l), 70A-9-102 (1) (a) . In re Durham, 1991, 935 F.2d 1160. Secured 
Transactions € ^ 3.1 
Original loan debt secured by assignment of annuity payments and the accompanying 
assignment were extinguished by successive loan transactions in which additional 
amounts were borrowed and notes were provided for the total amount which had been 
borrowed, with lender drawing check to itself from loan proceeds of second note 
which completely paid off original note, under Utah law. In re Durham, 1991, 935 
F.2d 1160. Secured Transactions €=> 201 
3. Motor vehicles 
While the Utah Motor Vehicle Act may regulate perfection of security interests in 
some motor vehicles, it is Utah Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) that regulates 
creation and attachment of security interests therein, and that determines nature 
of security interests in motor vehicle, including their classification as 
purchase-money or nonpurchase-money security interests. In re Curtis, 2006, 345 
B.R. 756. Secured Transactions ^ ^ 7 
U.C.A. 1953 § 70A-9a-109, UT ST § 70A-9a-109 
Current through end of 2006 legislation 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 70A. Uniform Commercial Code (Refs & Annos) 
^ Chapter 9A. Uniform Commercial Code--Secured Transactions (Refs & Annos) 
"ii Part 3 . Perfection and Priority 
-• § 70A-9a-333. Priority of certain liens arising by operation of law 
(1) In this section, "possessory lien" means an interest, other than a security 
interest or an agricultural lien: 
(a) which secures payment or performance of an obligation for services or 
materials furnished with respect to goods by a person in the ordinary course of 
the person's business; 
(b) which is created by statute or rule of law in favor of the person; and 
(c) whose effectiveness depends on the person's possession of the goods. 
(2) A possessory lien on goods has priority over a security interest in the goods 
unless the lien is created by a statute that expressly provides otherwise. 
Laws 2000, c. 252, § 93, eff. July 1, 2001. 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENT 
<For UCC acknowledgments, see UT ST UCC Acknowledgments.> 
1. Source. Former Section 9-310. 
2. "Possessory Liens." This section governs the relative priority of security 
interests arising under this Article and "possessory liens," i.e., common-law and 
statutory liens whose effectiveness depends on the lienor's possession of goods 
with respect to which the lienor provided services or furnished materials in the 
ordinary course of its business. As under former Section 9-310, the possessory 
lien has priority over a security interest unless the possessory lien is created 
by a statute that expressly provides otherwise. If the statute creating the 
possessory lien is silent as to its priority relative to a security interest, this 
section provides a rule of interpretation that the possessory lien takes priority, 
even if the statute has been construed judicially to make the possessory lien 
subordinate. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Prior Laws: 
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Laws 1965, c. 154. 
C. 1953, § 70A-9-310. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Secured Transactions €~~>144. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 349Akl44. 
C.J.S. Secured Transactions §§ 90/ 100 to 101. 
RESEARCH REFERENCES 
Forms 
6B Am. Jur. PI. & Pr. Forms UCC Article 9 § 9:174, Statutory References. 
U.C.C. Pleading and Practice Forms § 9:205, Statutory References. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
Repairman's lien 1 
1. Repairman's lien 
Repairman's lien was superior to secured party's claim to the property where 
evidence established that secured party requested that repairs be made to tractors 
and trailer, by virtue of letter authorizing such repairs when repairman inquired 
of secured party as to its wishes after owner declared bankruptcy and repairman 
learned of the security interest. U.C.A.1953, § 38-2-3. Gunnison Valley Bank v. 
Madsen, 1984, 685 P.2d 543. Secured Transactions €=> 144 
U.C.A. 1953 § 70A-9a-333, UT ST § 70A-9a-333 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-511 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
*® Chapter 6. Offenses Against Property 
*S Part 5. Fraud 
-• § 76-6-511. Defrauding creditors 
A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if: 
(1) he destroys, removes, conceals, encumbers, transfers, or otherwise deals with 
property subject to a security interest with a purpose to hinder enforcement of 
that interest; or 
(2) knowing that proceedings have been or are about to be instituted for the 
appointment of a person entitled to administer property for the benefit of 
creditors, he: 
(a) destroys, removes, conceals, encumbers, transfers, or otherwise deals with 
any property with a purpose to defeat or obstruct the claim of any creditor, or 
otherwise to obstruct the operation of any law relating to administration of 
property for the benefit of creditors; or 
(b) presents to any creditor or to an assignee for the benefit of creditors, 
orally or in writing, any statement relating to the debtor's estate, knowing that 
a material part of such statement is false. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-511; Laws 1991, c. 241, § 93. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Fraudulent Conveyances €^329. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 186k329. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-511, UT ST § 76-6-511 
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345 B.R. 756, 60 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 395 
(Cite as: 345 B.R. 756) 
C 
In re CurtisBkrtcy.D.Utah,2006. 
United States Bankruptcy Court,D. Utah. 
In re Travis Lane CURTIS, Debtor. 
No. 06-20001. 
July 11,2006. 
Background: Chapter 13 debtor objected to proofs 
of claim filed by creditors and requested that his 
plan be confirmed. 
Holdings: The Bankruptcy Court, Judith A. 
Boulden, J., held that: 
(1) protection against bifurcation and cramdown 
that is accorded by second part of hanging 
paragraph added by the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
(BAPCPA), like protection provided by preceding 
clause, is available only to purchase-money 
creditors; and 
(2) creditors had "purchase-money security interests 
" in motor vehicles that Chapter 13 debtor acquired 
within one-year of petition date, and were protected 
against bifurcation and cramdown. 
Objections overruled; confirmation denied. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Bankruptcy 51 €=^2575 
51 Bankruptcy 
51V The Estate 
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349Akl45 Conflicting Security Interests, 
Priorities Among 
349Akl46 k. Purchase Money Security 
Interests. Most Cited Cases 
Under Utah law, security interest in motor vehicle is 
classified as "purchase-money security interest," 
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the obligation. 
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51 Bankruptcy 
51XVIII Individual Debt Adjustment 
51k3704Plan 
51k3708 Secured Claims; Cram Down 
51k3708(8) k. Modification of Claim, 
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in motor vehicles that Chapter 13 debtor acquired 
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Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
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Protection Act (BAPCPA) from having their claims 
bifurcated in connection with "cramdown" of 
debtor's plan, where vehicles secured loans that 
debtor obtained to acquire interest in motor 
vehicles. 11U.S.C.A. § 1325(a). 
David T. Berry, Berry & Tripp P.C., Salt Lake City, 
UT, for Travis Lane Curtis. 
Weston L. Harris, Langdon T. Owen, Jr., Parsons 
Kinghorn Harris, Salt Lake City, UT, for Navistar 
Financial Corp. 
Kim R. Wilson, P. Matthew Cox, Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake City, UT, for 
DaimlerChrysler Financial Services Americas, 
L.L.C. 
J. Vincent Cameron, Salt Lake City, UT, Chapter 
13 Trustee. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION OVERRULING 
OBJECTIONS TO PROOFS OF CLAIM NO. 2 
AND NO. 10, AND DENYING 
CONFIRMATION OF THE DEBTORS 
CHAPTER 13 PL 4N 
Before the Court are the objections of Travis Lane 
Curtis (Debtor) to Proof of Claim No. 2 filed by 
Navistar Financial Corporation (Navistar) and Proof 
of Claim No. 10 filed by DaimleiChrysler Financial 
Services Americas, L.L.C. (Chrysler)(collectively 
the "Objections"), and the Debtor's request for 
confirmation of his chapter 13 plan. There are two 
issues common to the Objections and the 
confirmation of the Debtor's plan The first issue is 
whether the hanging paragraph found at the end of 
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) ¥Nl (hanging paragraph) 
requires a creditor to hold a purchase *758 money 
security interest in "any other thing of value" in 
order to prevent a debtor from cramming down a 
secured claim under § 506. The second issue is 
whether Navistar and Chrysler hold purchase 
money security interests in their respective 
collateral, which happen to be motor vehicles that 
the Debtor uses in his business and were purchased 
within one year of filing. 
FN1. All future statutory references are to 
title 11 of the United States Code unless 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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otherwise indicated. 
The Debtor argues that the hanging paragraph 
requires a creditor whose collateral was purchased 
within one year preceding the filing and consists of " 
any other thing of value" to possess a purchase 
money security interest in the collateral in order to 
avoid being crammed down under § 506. The 
Debtor also argues that, in this state, a creditor can 
never have a purchase money security interest in a 
motor vehicle since a creditor can only perfect its 
interest through compliance with the Utah Motor 
Vehicle Act (Motor Vehicle Act). FN2 Therefore, 
the Debtor argues, neither Navistar nor Chrysler 
have a purchase money security interest in their 
respective collateral, and the hanging paragraph 
does not prevent the Debtor from cramming down 
their claims. Navistar and Chrysler contend that 
they do not need a purchase money security interest 
to avoid the cram down of their claims and, 
regardless, that they do have purchase money 
security interests in their respective collateral. 
FN2. Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-101 (2006) 
et seq. 
The issue of whether the hanging paragraph 
requires a creditor to hold a purchase money 
security interest in "any other thing of value" in 
order to avoid being crammed down is a matter of 
first impression in this Court. FN3 The Court has 
carefully considered the parties' arguments and the 
issues presently before it, and has made an 
independent inquiry into the applicable law. The 
Court now enters the following Memorandum 
Decision. 
FN3. The Court has also been unable to 
find where any other court has decided this 
issue. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The material underlying facts are undisputed. On 
February 4, 2005, the Debtor purchased a 2001 
Kenworth 900L semi-truck tractor (Kenworth 
Tractor) for $68,985. The Debtor financed this 
purchase with a loan from Navistar and signed a 
security agreement granting it a security interest in 
the Kenworth Tractor. Navistar later perfected its 
security interest by notation of its lien on the 
Kenworth Tractor's title as required by § 41-la-601 
of the Motor Vehicle Act. One day later, the Debtor 
purchased a 1999 Peterbilt 379 semi-truck tractor 
(Peterbilt Tractor) for $50,934.90. The Debtor 
financed this purchase through a loan from Chrysler 
by again signing a security agreement and granting 
Chrysler a security interest in the Peterbilt Tractor. 
Chrysler also perfected its security interest by 
notation of its lien on the Peterbilt Tractor's title. 
Both the Kenworth Tractor and the Peterbilt Tractor 
(collectively the Tractors) were used in the Debtor's 
business and were not for personal use. They are 
not so called "910-day vehicles," FN4 therefore 
Navistar and Chrysler may avoid being crammed 
down only if the Tractors qualify as "any other 
thing of value" purchased within one year of the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition. 
FN4. A "910-day vehicle" is a motor 
vehicle, secured by a purchase money 
security interest, that was acquired for the 
debtor's personal use within 910 days 
preceding the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition. 
The Debtor filed his chapter 13 petition on January 
1, 2006, only eleven months after purchasing both 
Tractors. At the *759 time of filing, the Debtor 
still owed $54,177.32 to Navistar for the Kenworth 
Tractor and $37,704.05 to Chrysler for the Peterbilt 
Tractor. Both Navistar and Chrysler timely filed 
proofs of claim for these respective amounts and 
declared their status as secured creditors. The 
Debtor, however, proposed a plan that attempts to 
cram down the value of their claims. The Debtor 
asserts that the value of the Kenworth Tractor is 
$39,000 and the value of the Peterbilt Tractor is 
$27,000, and his plan proposes to pay each claim 
accordingly with the balance of the claims paid as 
unsecured. Navistar and Chrysler have objected to 
confirmation of the plan on the basis that it does not 
comply with § 1325(a) because it fails to pay their 
secured claims in full. They argue that the Debtor's 
proposed plan violates § 1325(a) because they have 
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collateral consisting of "any other thing of value" 
purchased within one year preceding the filing of 
the Debtor's bankruptcy petition meaning that their 
claims cannot be crammed down under the hanging 
paragraph. 
II. DISCUSSION 
This is a core matter and the Court may enter a final 
order.™5 The hanging paragraph of § 1325(a) was 
added to the Bankruptcy Code with the passage of 
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act (BAPCPA). This paragraph states 
that: 
FN5. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(K) and (L). 
For purposes of paragraph (5), section 506 shall not 
apply to a claim described in that paragraph if the 
creditor has a purchase money security interest 
securing the debt that is the subject of the claim, the 
debt was incurred within the 910-day [sic] 
preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and 
the collateral for that debt consists of a motor 
vehicle (as defined in section 30102 of title 49) 
acquired for the personal use of the debtor, or if 
collateral for that debt consists of any other thing of 
value, if the debt was incurred during the 1-year 
period preceding that filing. 
Section 506 allows a debtor to bifurcate secured 
claims and "cram down" the secured portion of the 
debt to the value of the collateral. The remaining 
balance is then reclassified and paid through the 
plan as a non-priority unsecured claim. The 
hanging paragraph, however, prevents a debtor 
from cramming down a secured claim in two 
situations. The first situation is where the creditor 
has a purchase money security interest in a 910-day 
vehicle. The second situation, which is a subject of 
this dispute, involves collateral consisting of "any 
other thing of value" purchased within one year 
before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The 
parties' disagreement centers on whether the 
hanging paragraph requires that a creditor have a 
purchase money security interest in "any other thing 
of value" in order to avoid having its claim 
crammed down. 
The Court finds that a creditor that has collateral in " 
any other thing of value" purchased within one year 
before the filing of the petition must possess a 
purchase money security interest in said collateral 
to avoid having its claim crammed down under § 
506. The Court also finds that both Navistar and 
Chrysler do have purchase money security interests 
in their respective collateral. Accordingly, their 
claims may not be crammed down, and the Debtor's 
proposed plan does not comply with § 1325(a). 
A. A Creditor Must Possess a Purchase Money 
Security Interest in Either Type of Collateral 
[1] The Debtor has argued that a purchase money 
security interest is required *760 in either a 910-day 
vehicle or "any other thing of value" purchased 
within one year preceding the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition in order for a creditor to avoid 
being crammed down under § 506. Navistar and 
Chrysler both contend that a purchase money 
security interest is only required for a 910-day 
vehicle, and that a creditor whose collateral consists 
of "any other thing of value" cannot be crammed 
down under § 506 regardless of the nature of its 
security interest. The Court finds that the plain and 
unambiguous language of the statute supports the 
Debtor's argument. Therefore, the Court 
determines that a creditor claiming protection under 
the hanging paragraph from a § 506 cram down 
must hold a purchase money security interest where 
its collateral consists of "any other thing of value" 
purchased within one year prior to filing. 
1. The Language of the Statute Supports the 
Debtor's Argument 
[2] In attempting to construe the hanging paragraph, 
the Court "must begin with the language employed 
by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary 
meaning of the language accurately expresses the 
legislative purpose." FN6 The Court is also guided 
by the 10th Circuit's direction that "[w]hen the 
terms of the statute are clear and unambiguous, that 
language is controlling absent rare and exceptional 
circumstances." FN7 
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FN6. Engine Mfrs. Ass'n. v. S. Coast Air 
Quality Mgmt. Dist, 541 U.S. 246, 252, 
124 S.Ct. 1756, 158 L.Ed.2d 529 (2004) 
(quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park 
& Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194, 105 S.Ct. 
658,83L.Ed.2d582(1985)). 
FN7. Ansari v. Qwest Commc'ns. Corp., 
414 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir.2005) 
(quoting True Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 
170 F.3d 1294, 1299 (10th Cir.1999)). 
The plain and unambiguous language of the hanging 
paragraph demonstrates that a creditor must have a 
purchase money security interest in collateral 
consisting of "any other thing of value" in order to 
avoid being crammed down under § 506. The 
second part of the hanging paragraph, which relates 
to this type of collateral, states "... or if collateral 
for that debt consists of any other thing of value...." 
FN8
 The use of the adjective "that" in this section 
indicates a reference to a previously mentioned 
debt. Specifically, it refers to "the debt that is the 
subject of the claim" mentioned earlier in the 
hanging paragraph.™9 The hanging paragraph 
also requires that a creditor seeking to avoid being 
crammed down must have "a purchase money 
security interest securing" this debt. The hanging 
paragraph then explains that "the debt that is the 
subject of the claim" is a debt for which the 
collateral is either a 910-day vehicle or "any other 
thing of value" purchased within one year prior to 
the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 
FN8. Emphasis added. 
FN9. When questioned at the confirmation 
hearing, neither Navistar nor Chrysler 
could reasonably explain what the term " 
that debt" refers to if it does not refer to " 
the debt that is the subject of the claim." 
It is apparent from the plain language that the 
difference between the first and second part of the 
hanging paragraph lies in the type of collateral 
involved in the transaction and not in the nature of 
the creditor's security interest. It is equally 
apparent that a creditor must be secured by a 
purchase money security interest no matter which 
type of collateral is involved in the transaction. 
This is the only interpretation of the hanging 
paragraph that *761 gives a reasonable and 
unambiguous meaning to the phrase "that debt" and 
to the hanging paragraph as a whole. Therefore, a 
creditor seeking to avoid being crammed down by 
virtue of the protections of the hanging paragraph 
must have a purchase money security interest in its 
collateral, whether a 910-day vehicle or "any other 
thing of value." 
2. The Argument of Navistar and Chrysler 
Would Create an Absurdly Expansive 
Interpretation of the Hanging Paragraph 
[3] Where the language of the statute is plain, "the 
sole function of the courts-at least where the 
disposition required by the text is not absurd-is to 
enforce it according to its terms." ^ ^ The only 
absurd result in this case would be to adopt the 
interpretation of the hanging paragraph that 
Navistar and Chrysler proffer. Their interpretation 
would result in an expansive reading of the statute 
that would abolish the debtor's cram down powers 
under § 506 for every type of collateral purchased 
within one year prior to filing: a drastic change 
from prior law. It is difficult to think that Congress 
was not aware of the extensive use of "title loans" 
and other high-interest, short-term, non-purchase 
money interests in today's sub-prime financing 
markets. Had Congress intended such an 
expansive alteration of the Bankruptcy Code, one 
would think that it would have made this abundantly 
clear in drafting the hanging paragraph. There is 
no evidence that Congress intended this result, and 
the only logical reading of the statute that gives 
meaning to the phrase "that debt" is to require that 
the creditor have a purchase money security interest 
in one of the two types of collateral listed in the 
hanging paragraph. The Court, therefore, 
determines that the hanging paragraph requires that 
a creditor have a purchase money security interest 
in "any other thing of value" purchased within one 
year of filing the bankruptcy petition in order to 
avoid being crammed down under § 506. 
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FN 10. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. 
Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6, 
120 S.Ct. 1942, 147 L.Ed.2d 1 (2000) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
B. Chrysler and Navistar Have Purchase Money 
Security Interests under the UCC 
The Debtor argues that a security interest in a motor 
vehicle becomes secured by operation of the Motor 
Vehicle Act and not Chapter 9a of the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),™11 which 
means that it is the Motor Vehicle Act that regulates 
the creation of security interests in motor vehicles. 
This leads the Debtor to conclude that creditors can 
never have a purchase money security interest in a 
motor vehicle since the Motor Vehicle Act does not 
provide for such interests. Although imaginative, 
the Debtor's argument is nevertheless incorrect. 
FN11. Utah Code 
(2006) et seq. 
Ann. § 70A-9a-101 
1. The UCC Regulates the Securing of a 
Creditor's Interest in a Motor Vehicle 
[4][5] Section § 70A-9a-109(l)(a) of the UCC 
states that "[ejxcept as otherwise provided in 
Subsections (3) and (4), [the UCC applies] to a 
transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a 
security interest in personal property or fixtures by 
contract." In other words, the UCC regulates the 
creation of a security interest unless specifically 
stated otherwise. The Debtor argues that § 
70A-9a-109(3)(b) of the UCC dictates that it is the 
Motor Vehicle Act that actually regulates security 
interests*762 in motor vehicles. This section 
states that the UCC does not apply to the extent that 
"another statute of this state expressly governs the 
creation, perfection, priority, or enforcement of a 
security interest created by this state or a 
governmental unit of this state." FNn The Debtor 
reasons that since the Motor Vehicle Act regulates 
the perfection of a security interest in a motor 
vehicle,™13 it is that statute that determines how 
and when a creditor becomes secured. The Debtor's 
arguments fails for two reasons. The first reason is 
that § 70A-9a-109(3)(b) of the UCC only applies to 
transactions where the security interest was created 
by "this state or a governmental unit of this state" 
meaning transactions where the state government is 
the debtor. FN14 Neither Navistar nor Chrysler is 
a governmental debtor so this section is 
inapplicable to this case. The second reason is that 
a creditor becomes secured at the moment its 
security interest attaches to the collateral and not 
when it is perfected. Thus, it is the UCC and not 
the Motor Vehicle Act that determines how a 
creditor becomes secured and whether the creditor 
has a purchase money security interest. 
FN12. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-109(3)(b) 
FN13. It should be noted that the Motor 
Vehicle Act does not regulate the 
perfection of security interests in all motor 
vehicles. As stated in Utah Code Ann. § 
41-la-601(2), perfection of a security 
interest "in inventory consisting in part of 
vehicles subject to registration under this 
chapter, that are held for sale by a person 
in the business of selling goods of that 
kind, shall be perfected under Section 
70A-9a-310[oftheUCC]." 
FN14. See also U.C.C. § 9-109 Official 
Comment 9. 
2. A Creditor is Secured When Its Security 
Interest Attaches to the Collateral 
The document that creates the creditor's security 
interest is the security agreement. The UCC 
defines a "security agreement" as "an agreement 
that creates or provides for a security interest." ¥Nl5 
A "security interest" is defined by the UCC 
as "an interest in personal property ... which secures 
payment or performance of an obligation." ^ ^ 
These UCC definitions are consistent with the 
Bankruptcy Code definition that "[t]he term ' 
security interest' means lien created by an 
agreement,'" FN17 and the "[t]erm 'security 
agreement' means agreement that creates or 
provides for a security interest." ^ ^ So by UCC 
definition the security agreement is the document 
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that creates the creditor's interest in the collateral, 
and it is that interest that secures the obligation. In 
short, the security agreement creates the security 
interest and the security interest is what makes the 
creditor secured. 
FN15. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-102(73). 
FN16. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-l-201(37)(a) 
(emphasis added). 
FN17. Section 101(51). 
FN18. Section 101(50). 
[6][7] [8] A creditor, however, cannot claim secured 
status until the security interest becomes 
enforceable against the debtor. Security interests, 
including purchase money security interests, attach 
to the collateral and become "enforceable against 
the debtor" ™19 at the point that there has been 
value given for the collateral, the debtor had rights 
in the collateral or the power to transfer rights to a 
secured party, and the debtor has signed a security 
agreement that properly describes the collateral. FN20 
The use of the phrase "enforceable* 763 
against the debtor" in § 70A-9a-203(l) and (2) of 
the UCC demonstrates that the creditor has the 
ability to enforce the security agreement, including 
any provisions dictating the right to foreclose on the 
collateral,™21 at the moment the security interest 
attaches to the collateral. A creditor, therefore, is 
classified as a secured creditor at the moment its 
security interest attaches to the collateral. Whether 
that security interest is then perfected does not 
change the creditor's secured status under the UCC 
or alter its treatment under the hanging paragraph. 
FN19. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-203(2). 
FN20. Utah Code Ann. § 
70A-9a-203(2)(a)-(c). 
FN21. See Utah Code Ann. § 
70A-9a-201(l) (stating "a security 
agreement is effective according to its 
terms"). 
3. A Creditor Can Have a Purchase Money 
Security Interest in a Motor Vehicle 
[9] [10] Contrary to the Debtor's assertion, it is 
possible to have a purchase money security interest 
in a motor vehicle. The UCC provides that "[a] 
security interest in goods is a purchase money 
security interestf ] to the extent that the goods are 
purchase money collateral with respect to that 
security interest." FN22 "Goods" refers to "all 
things that are moveable when a security interest 
attaches," FN23 which is a term that includes motor 
vehicles.™24 The term "purchase money collateral 
" in § 70A-9a-103(2)(a) of the UCC means goods 
that secure "a purchase money obligation incurred 
with respect to that collateral." FN25 A "purchase 
money obligation" refers to "an obligation of an 
obligor incurred ... for value given to enable the 
debtor to acquire rights in or the use of the 
collateral if the value is in fact so used." FN26 A 
security interest in a motor vehicle, therefore, is 
classified as a purchase money security interest 
where the motor vehicle secures the debtor's 
obligation and was purchased using the financing 
that gave rise to the obligation. 
FN22. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-103(2)(a) 
FN23. Utah Code 
70A-9a-102(44)(a). 
Ann. 
FN24. In the present case, the Tractors 
would more appropriately be classified as " 
equipment," which are a sub-category of 
goods, under Utah Code Ann. § 
70A-9a-102(33). 
FN25. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-103(l)(a) 
FN26. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-103(l)(b) 
The Debtor appears to be confusing the issue of 
attachment-the moment at which the creditor 
becomes secured-with perfection-the method by 
which the creditor gives notice to third parties of its 
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secured status. Although a secured creditor whose 
claim is unperfected may have its claim subjugated 
to those of more senior creditors, the unperfected 
secured creditor remains secured by virtue of its 
attached security interest.™27 While the Motor 
Vehicle Act may regulate the perfection of a 
security interest in some motor vehicles, it is the 
UCC that regulates the creation and attachment of 
the security interest itself. Thus, it is the UCC that 
dictates whether a creditor is secured and 
determines the nature of the security interest, 
including its classification as a purchase money 
security interest in a motor vehicle. 
FN27. The Court recognizes that § 544 
gives the trustee the power to avoid 
unperfected security interests, thus 
rendering the creditor's claim unsecured. 
Section 544, however, is not applicable to 
the present action. 
[11] The Debtor's argument that a creditor can 
never have a purchase money security interest in a 
motor vehicle in Utah eviscerates the first part of 
the hanging paragraph related to 910-day vehicles. 
FN28 *7£4 Congress declared in the hanging 
paragraph, and neither party disputes, that a creditor 
whose collateral consists of a 910-day vehicle must 
hold a purchase money security in order to avoid 
being crammed down. If, as the Debtor alleges, a 
creditor can never possess a purchase money 
security interest in a motor vehicle then a creditor 
whose collateral is a 910-day vehicle would always 
be subject to the cram down of its claim. The 
hanging paragraph, particularly the first section, 
would have absolutely no meaning. This 
interpretation not only defies common sense but it 
violates a fundamental rule of statutory 
construction. As the Supreme Court has explained, 
"[i]t is a cardinal principle of statutory construction 
that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so 
construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, 
sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or 
insignificant." FN29 To adopt the Debtor's 
argument would make the first part of the hanging 
paragraph superfluous, void, and insignificant. The 
Court rejects the Debtor's argument in this regard. 
FN28. It would also eviscerate the second 
part of the hanging paragraph where the 
creditor's collateral consists of a motor 
vehicle used for business purposes that was 
acquired within one year of the filing of 
the petition. 
FN29. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 
31, 122 S.Ct. 441, 151 L.Ed.2d 339 (2001) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
4. Chrysler and Navistar Both Have Purchase 
Money Security Interests in Their Respective 
Collateral and Cannot be Crammed Down 
[12] Both Navistar and Chrysler have signed 
security agreements with the Debtor granting them a 
security interest in the Tractors. The Tractors are 
goods that secure the Debtor's obligation to repay 
the loans, which obligation was incurred in order to 
allow the Debtor to acquire rights in the Tractors. 
By definition under § 70A-9a-203 of the UCC, 
Navistar and Chrysler have purchase money 
security interests in the Tractors, both of which 
have value and were each purchased within one 
year of the filing of the Debtor's bankruptcy 
petition. Consequently, the hanging paragraph 
prevents the Debtor from cramming down the 
secured claims of either Navistar or Chrysler. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The plain language of the hanging paragraph 
demonstrates that a creditor must have a purchase 
money security interest in "any other thing of value" 
purchased within one year preceding the filing of 
the bankruptcy petition in order to avoid having its 
claim crammed down under § 506. The 
Bankruptcy Code defines security interests in a 
manner consistent with the UCC, which is the 
statute that regulates the creation of security 
interests, including purchase money security 
interests, in motor vehicles. Both Navistar and 
Chrysler are secured by purchase money security 
interests in "any other thing of value" purchased 
within one year before the filing of the Debtor's 
petition, and the Debtor cannot cram down their 
secured claims. The Court overrules the Debtor's 
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Objections to Proofs of Claim No. 2 and No. 10 and 
denies confirmation of his chapter 13 plan for 
failure to comply with § 1325(a). This denial of 
confirmation is without prejudice, and the Debtor 
may propose another chapter 13 plan consistent 
with this Memorandum Decision. A separate order 
will issue contemporaneously herewith. 
Bkrtcy.D.Utah,2006. 
In re Curtis 
345 B.R. 756, 60 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 395 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Foutz v. City of South JordanUtah,2004. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Brent FOUTZ, Aleta Taylor, Drew Chamberlain, 
Michael Ann Rippen, Jordan River Nature Center, 
Inc., and Friends of Midas Creek, Inc., Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
v. 
CITY OF SOUTH JORDAN, a body politic, and 
City of South Jordan Community Development 
Department, Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 20020642. 
Aug. 27, 2004. 
Background: Environmental groups and others 
brought action against city and city community 
development department, alleging that city council 
approved construction of a parking lot near river in 
violation of city ordinance. The District Court, 
Third District, Salt Lake County, Sandra Peuler, J., 
dismissed the action based on statute of limitations. 
Environmental groups and others appealed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Parrish, J., held 
that: 
(1) environmental group was required to exhaust 
administrative remedies and file petition for review 
within 30 days of council's decision, and thus 
failure to do so required dismissal of appeal, and 
(2) city ordinance which stated that violation of 
zoning title "shall be deemed a separate offense for 
each day the violation exists" did not extend 
limitations period. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Appeal and Error 30 €=^863 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on 
Nature of Decision Appealed from 
30k863 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Review of a grant of a motion to dismiss presents 
questions of law that the court reviews for 
correctness, giving no deference to the decision of 
the district court. 
[2] Statutes 361 €^>181(1) 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361kl80 Intention of Legislature 
36lkl81 In General 
361kl81(l) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Statutes 361 €==>184 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
36 lkl 80 Intention of Legislature 
361kl84 k. Policy and Purpose of Act. 
Most Cited Cases 
Statutes 361 €=^188 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361kl87 Meaning of Language 
361kl88 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
The primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give 
effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the 
plain language, in light of the purpose the statute 
was meant to achieve. 
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[3] Statutes 361 €^>205 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic 
Aids to Construction 
361k205 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Statutes 361 €=^223.1 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k223 Construction with Reference to 
Other Statutes 
361k223.1 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
The court reads the plain language of the statute as 
a whole, and interprets its provisions in harmony 
with other statutes in the same chapter and related 
chapters. 
[4] Statutes 361 €=^206 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic 
Aids to Construction 
361k206 k. Giving Effect to Entire 
Statute. Most Cited Cases 
The court strives to construe statutes in a manner 
that renders all parts thereof relevant and 
meaningful. 
[5] Zoning and Planning 414 €=^562 
414 Zoning and Planning 
414X Judicial Review or Relief 
414X(A) In General 
414k562 k. Exhaustion of Administrative 
Remedies. Most Cited Cases 
Environmental group and others challenging city 
council's approval of parking lot near river were 
required to exhaust their administrative remedies 
and file a petition for review within 30 days of the 
council's decision pursuant to appeals section of 
Municipal Land Use Development and 
Management Act (MLUDMA), although act's 
enforcement section authorized actions to enforce 
municipal land use ordinances without reference to 
any exhaustion requirement or limitations period, 
and thus failure to timely exhaust remedies required 
dismissal of appeal. U.C.A.1953, 10-9-1002; 
U.C.A.1953, 10-9-1001(1), (2)(a) (2002). 
[6] Statutes 361 €=^190 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361kl87 Meaning of Language 
361kl90 k. Existence of Ambiguity. 
Most Cited Cases 
If the language of a statute is ambiguous, the court 
may look to the statutory scheme to divine 
legislative intent. 
[7] Zoning and Planning 414 €^586 
414 Zoning and Planning 
414X Judicial Review or Relief 
414X(B) Proceedings 
414k584 Time for Proceedings 
414k586 k. Commencement of 
Limitation Period. Most Cited Cases 
City ordinance which stated that a violation of the 
city's zoning title "shall be deemed a separate 
offense for each day the violation exists" did not 
extend 30-day limitations period for environmental 
groups and others to challenge city council's 
decision to approve construction of a parking lot 
near a river; city council rendered land use decision 
when it met, discussed, and voted on the site plan, 
and limitations provision ran from the time the city 
rendered a "decision" rather than from the time of 
an alleged violation. U.C.A.1953, 10-9-1001(1), 
(2)(a) (2002). 
*1172 Jeffrey W. Appel, Jennifer L. Crane, Kristine 
M. Larsen, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs. 
Jody K. Burnett, Robert C. Keller, Salt Lake City, 
and W. Paul Thompson, Melanie M. Serassio, 
South Jordan, for defendants. 
PARRISH, Justice: 
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If 1 Plaintiffs Brent Foutz, Aleta Taylor, Drew 
Chamberlain, Michael Ann Rippen, Jordan River 
Nature Center, Inc., and Friends of Midas Creek, 
Inc., appeal the district court's dismissal of their 
action against the City of South Jordan and the 
South Jordan Community Development 
Department. Plaintiffs filed an enforcement action 
under section 10-9-1002 of the Utah Code, alleging 
that the South Jordan City Council approved 
construction of a parking lot near the Jordan River 
in violation of city ordinance. The district court 
dismissed plaintiffs' action, holding that it was, in 
reality, a challenge to the city's land use decision 
and was therefore barred because plaintiffs failed to 
file it within the 30-day limitations period specified 
by section 10-9-1001 of the Utah Code. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
K 2 The South Jordan City Council approved the 
Riverpark Site Plan on February 14, 2001. The 
Site Plan, proposed by Anderson Development 
Company, contemplated construction of an office 
building and parking lot near the Jordan River. 
The Site Plan initially was reviewed by the city 
planning staff and transferred to the South Jordan 
Planning Commission with a positive 
recommendation. The Planning Commission held 
a public hearing on the plan and thereafter 
transferred it to the City Council with a 
recommendation that it be approved. Following 
public notice and an additional public hearing, the 
City Council unanimously approved the plan. 
If 3 Construction of the office building and 
adjacent parking structure called for by the Site 
Plan commenced in the summer of 2001. In July 
2001, plaintiffs contacted South Jordan and 
complained that the construction project violated a 
city ordinance aimed at preserving natural areas 
surrounding the Jordan River. Plaintiffs asked 
South Jordan to issue a written stop order pursuant 
to the "Zoning Enforcement" section of the South 
Jordan City code. When South Jordan refused to 
do so, plaintiffs sought review by the South Jordan 
Board of Adjustment. According to plaintiffs' 
complaint, the Board of Adjustment declined to 
review the request on jurisdictional grounds. 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim 
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K 4 Plaintiffs filed suit in the district court on 
October 4, 2001, seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief pursuant to Utah Code section 10-9-1002. 
That section, which is part of the Municipal Land 
Use Development and Management Act 
(MLUDMA), Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9-101 to 
-1003 (2001), provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
Enforcement. 
(l)(a) A municipality or any owner of real estate 
within the municipality in which violations of this 
chapter or ordinances enacted under the authority of 
this chapter occur or are about to occur may, in 
addition to other remedies provided by law, institute: 
(i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any other 
appropriate actions; or 
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove 
the unlawful building, use, or act. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1002(1 )(a) (2001). We 
will refer to this section as the "Enforcement" 
section. 
1f 5 Plaintiffs' suit alleged that the city had violated 
South Jordan City ordinance 97-7. Ordinance 
97-7, passed in April 1997, amended the "South 
Jordan City Zoning Map and Zoning Ordinance" by 
changing property near the Jordan River from an 
agricultural zone to an office service zone. The 
ordinance specifically excepted property "located 
within the 100-year flood plain and meander 
corridor along the Jordan River ... which shall 
continue to be designated on the Future Land Use 
Plan Map as recreation/open space or preservation 
areas." South Jordan, Utah, Ordinance 97-7 (Apr. 
28, 1997). According to plaintiffs, the parking 
structure contemplated by the Riverpark Site Plan 
violated ordinance 97-7 because it was to be located 
in the excepted flood plain and corridor area. 
*1173 Plaintiffs also alleged in their complaint that 
the Site Plan violated a master development 
agreement that South Jordan had entered into with 
Anderson Development Company in April 1998. FN1 
FN1. In addition, plaintiffs alleged that 
South Jordan's approval of the Site Plan 
violated city resolution 97-9. Resolution 
97-9, passed in January 1997, amended the 
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"Future Land Use Map of the Land Use 
Element of the General Plan of the City of 
South Jordan" to provide for the possible 
development of office buildings near the 
Jordan River m an area previously 
reserved for "recreation/open space and 
preservation uses" Similar to the 
ordinance, the resolution provided that 
land "within the 100-year flood plam and 
meander corridor along the Jordan River ... 
shall continue to be designated on the 
Future Land Use Plan Map as 
recreation/open space or preservation areas. 
" South Jordan, Utah, Resolution 97-9 
(Jan. 28, 1997). 
K 6 South Jordan responded to plaintiffs' complaint 
on the merits, alleging that the Site Plan violated 
neither city ordinance nor the master plan 
agreement. In addition, South Jordan moved to 
dismiss the action on the basis that plaintiffs had 
failed to initiate it within 30 days of the city's 
approval of the Site Plan. South Jordan argued that 
approval of the Site Plan constituted a land use 
decision that had to be challenged, if at all, within 
the time specified by section 10-9-1001 of the Utah 
Code. That section, also part of the MLUDMA, 
provides, m relevant part, as follows: 
Appeals. 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a 
municipality's land use decisions made under this 
chapter or under the regulation made under 
authority of this chapter until that person has 
exhausted his administrative remedies. 
(2)(a) Any person adversely affected by any 
decision made m the exercise of the provisions of 
this chapter may file a petition for review of the 
decision with the district court within 30 days after 
the local decision is rendered. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(1), (2)(a) (2001).FN2 
We will refer to this section as the "Appeals" 
section. 
FN2. Paragraph (2)(a) of section 10-9-1001 
was amended m 2003. Utah Code Ann. § 
10-9-1001 (2003). We recite the section 
as it appeared prior to amendment. 
% 7 The district court granted South Jordan's 
motion to dismiss. It stated* 
[The Appeals section] requires individuals 
challenging a municipality's land use decision to file 
a petition for review with the district court within 
thirty (30) days after the local decision is rendered. 
In this case, the South Jordan City Council 
approved the Riverpark Site Plan for development 
on February 14, 2001. Plaintiffs, however, failed 
to file a complaint with this Court until October 4, 
2001-well outside the statutory thirty (30) day 
review period. 
The district court also rejected plaintiffs' argument 
that construction of the parking structure constituted 
a contmuing violation that tolled the 30-day limit 
Plaintiffs timely appealed the district court's ruling. 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to section 
78-2-2(3)0) of the Utah Code. Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3)0) (2002). 
ANALYSIS 
[1] f 8 Review of a grant of a motion to dismiss 
presents questions of law that we review for 
correctness, giving no deference to the decision of 
the district court. State v Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 
17, 70 P.3d 111. In this case, we review for 
correctness the district court's interpretation and 
application of sections 10-9-1001 and 10-9-1002 of 
the Utah Code. See State ex rel Div of Forestry, 
Fire & State Lands v Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, % 
8, 44 P.3d 680 ("[A] district court's interpretation 
of a statutory provision is a question of law that we 
review for correctness."). 
H 9 On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the district 
court erred in granting South Jordan's motion to 
dismiss because the Enforcement section, section 
10-9-1002, provides them with an avenue of relief 
separate and apart from that available under the 
Appeals section, section 10-9-1001. Plaintiffs 
assert that the 30-day limitations penod contamed 
in the Appeals section cannot be applied to actions 
brought under the Enforcement section. 
*1174 If 10 In contrast, South Jordan contends that 
plaintiffs actually are challenging a "land use 
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decision" governed by the Appeals section. South 
Jordan maintains that the time limits imposed by the 
Appeals section apply to all challenges to municipal 
land use decisions. It urges that plaintiffs not be 
allowed to circumvent the requirements of that 
section by characterizing their claim as an " 
enforcement action" brought pursuant to section 
10-9-1002. 
[2] [3] [4] If 11 This case requires that we reconcile 
the Appeals section, section 10-9-1001, with the 
Enforcement section, section 10-9-1002. "[0]ur 
primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect 
to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain 
language, in light of the purpose the statute was 
meant to achieve." State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, f 
25, 4 P.3d 795; see also Bd. of Educ. of Jordan 
Sch. Dist v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37, 1f 8, 
94 P.3d 234. "We read the plain language of the 
statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in 
harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and 
related chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, If 
17, 66 P.3d 592 (quotation and citation omitted). 
We strive to construe statutes in a manner that 
renders "all parts thereof relevant and meaningful." 
Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 
1292 (Utah 1996). We analyze the provisions of 
the Appeals and Enforcement sections with these 
principles in mind. 
[5] If 12 The Appeals section requires that parties 
seeking to challenge municipal land use decisions 
exhaust their administrative remedies and file a 
petition for review within 30 days of the decision at 
issue. In contrast, the Enforcement section 
authorizes parties to initiate actions to enforce 
municipal land use ordinances without reference to 
any exhaustion requirement or limitations period. 
Plaintiffs' challenge to the construction of the 
parking structure arguably straddles both sections. 
Although plaintiffs contend that the existence of the 
parking structure constitutes a continuing violation 
of city ordinance giving rise to an enforcement 
action, they concede that the city's approval of the 
Site Plan, which authorized construction of the 
parking structure, constitutes a land use decision. 
If 13 Considered in isolation, the provisions of the 
Enforcement section could be construed to provide 
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plaintiffs an avenue for redress from South Jordan's 
land use decision-an avenue in which plaintiffs 
would have to neither exhaust administrative 
remedies nor comply with a deadline. We are not, 
however, free to construe the sections at issue in 
isolation or to adopt an interpretation that would 
render one of them meaningless. Rather, we read 
them in conjunction one with another, attempting to 
give effect to and harmonize their collective 
provisions. Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770, 
773 (Utah 1991). 
If 14 Because virtually every challenge to a land 
use decision could be alternatively characterized as 
an "enforcement" action, allowing a challenge to a 
municipality's land use decision under the 
Enforcement section would nullify the very 
existence of the exhaustion and timing requirements 
specified in the Appeals section. We therefore 
hold that plaintiffs, as parties seeking redress from a 
municipal land use decision, were obligated to 
comply with the requirements of the Appeals 
section. 
[6] f 15 This construction is consistent with the 
apparent purpose of the statutory scheme.™3 The 
Appeals section specifically addresses the appeal of 
municipal land use decisions made pursuant to the 
MLUDMA. By requiring the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies and the filing of a petition 
for review within 30 days, the provisions of the 
Appeals section evince a legislative intent to 
encourage the quick resolution of disputes over land 
use decisions and to recognize the *1175 authority 
granted to municipal decision-making bodies. 
FN3. "Where the language of a statute is 
ambiguous, we may look to the statutory 
scheme to divine legislative intent." 
Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist, 2002 UT 
130, 1f 21, 63 P.3d 705 (citing State v. 
Burns, 2000 UT 56, K 25, 4 P.3d 795). 
Because the Enforcement and Appeals 
sections overlap, imposing inconsistent 
requirements on the same case, the statutes 
taken together are ambiguous. Cf United 
States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 
519, 523 (Utah 1993) ("An ambiguity in a 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
100 P.3d 1171 Page 6 
100 P.3d 1171, 507 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 2004 UT 75 
(Cite as: 100 P.3d 1171) 
contract [results when] two or more 
contract provisions, when read together, 
give rise to different or inconsistent 
meanings, even though each provision is 
clear when read alone."). 
1f 16 The apparent statutory purpose of the 
Appeals section of the MLUDMA is identical to the 
purpose of the parallel provision of the County 
Land Use Development and Management Act 
(CLUDMA), which governs land use decisions by 
counties, rather than municipalities. In Lund v. 
Cottonwood Meadows Co., we found: 
The 90-day limitation [period] ^^ is designed to 
assure speedy appeal to the proper tribunal any 
grievance that a party may have who is adversed 
[sic] by a decision of an administrative agency. 
The evident purpose of the statute is to assure the 
expeditious and orderly development of a 
community.... 
FN4. In Lund, the court analyzed section 
17-27-16 of the 1953 Utah Code. 392 P.2d 
at 42. That section was the predecessor to 
section 17-27-1001 of the current 
CLUDMA. See Bennion v. Sundance 
Dev. Corp., 897 P.2d 1232, 1237 (Utah 
Ct.App.1995); Utah Code Ann. § 
17-27-16 (1953); Utah Code Ann. § 
17-27-1001 (2001); see also ffl[ 19-20, 
infra. 
15 Utah 2d 305, 392 P.2d 40, 42 (1964). 
U 17 Consistent with these principles, the 
Enforcement section is available to parties seeking 
redress from an alleged ordinance violation in 
circumstances where the alleged violation is not 
authorized by or embodied in a municipal land use 
decision. When the alleged violation arises 
directly from a municipal land use decision, the 
parties must comply with the requirements of the 
statutory provision that specifically addresses 
appeals from land use decisions, section 10-9-1001. 
The court reviewing the appeal may then 
determine whether the land use decision was " 
arbitrary, capricious," or, as in the case of violated 
ordinances, "illegal." Utah Code Ann. § 
10-9-1001(3) (2001). 
Tj 18 In reaching the interpretation we enunciate 
today, we are cognizant of the fact that the statutory 
provisions are not entirely clear and that the 
position urged by plaintiffs is not without some 
appeal.™5 We take comfort, however, from the 
fact that our interpretation is consistent with the 
apparent statutory purpose and that the legislature 
is, of course, free to amend the statutes to eliminate 
their ambiguity. 
FN5. Plaintiffs' position is supported by 
the presence in the Enforcement section of 
language providing that the remedies there 
are "in addition to other remedies provided 
by law." Utah Code Ann. § 
10-9-1002(l)(a)(2001). 
% 19 We take further comfort from the fact that our 
interpretation is consistent with our interpretation of 
a predecessor parallel statute that this court 
considered some four decades ago. In Lund, we 
interpreted sections 17-27-1001 and 17-27-1002 of 
the Utah Code, the predecessor sections to the 
current CLUDMA, Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-27-101 
to -1003 (2001). 392 P.2d at 42. As previously 
noted, the provisions of the CLUDMA parallel the 
provisions of sections 10-9-1001 and 10-9-1002 of 
the MLUDMA that are at issue here. 
f 20 In Lund, the plaintiff sought to prevent the 
development of a mobile home park after the Salt 
Lake County planning commission had approved 
the plan for the park. Id. at 41. The plaintiff 
argued that he was not required to exhaust 
administrative remedies as required by section 
17-27-16 (the predecessor to section 17-27-1001) 
because the builders of the mobile home park were 
in actual violation of a zoning ordinance, and 
therefore section 17-27-23 (the predecessor to 
section 17-27-1002) provided him with an 
alternative avenue of relief. Id. at 42.FN6 While 
recognizing that section 17-27-23 provided a 
general means of redress for the violation of 
ordinances, Lund held that the plaintiff was 
nevertheless required to fulfill the requirements of 
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section 17-27-16 because he was challenging an 
administrative decision: 
FN6. The operative language of the 
provision at issue in Lund, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 17-27-16, 17-27-23 (1964), is 
substantially equivalent to that at issue 
here. See Bennion, 897 P.2d at 1235-37 
(discussing Lund and setting forth the 
language of sections 17-27-16 and 
17-27-23). Indeed, section 17-27-23 of 
the Utah Code that was at issue in Lund 
and the Enforcement section at issue in this 
case both contain identical language 
providing that the remedies they 
contemplate are "in addition to other 
remedies provided by law." 
Sec[tion] 17-27-23 gives land owners a separate 
cause of action in the courts when a violation of a 
zoning resolution is charged. But where, as in this 
case, the alleged violation of the ordinance arose 
*1176 from the administration of a zoning 
ordinance by an administrative officer or agency, as 
provided in Sec[tion] 17-27-16, appeal from that 
administrative ruling should have been taken to the 
proper administrative tribunal, or a suit should have 
been commenced in the courts within the statutory 
period.... 
Id. 
TJ 21 The court of appeals reached the same 
conclusion in Bennion v. Sundance Development 
Corp., 897 P.2d 1232 (Utah Ct.App.1995). In 
Bennion, the plaintiff challenged the county 
commission's approval of a recreational resort plan, 
arguing that the commission's approval violated 
zoning ordinances and Utah law. Id. at 1233-34. 
The plaintiff contended that although he had not 
exhausted administrative remedies under section 
17-27-1001, section 17-27-1002 provided a 
separate avenue of relief because the developer was 
in actual violation of a zoning ordinance. Id. at 
1237. The court of appeals upheld the dismissal of 
the plaintiffs action, holding that because the 
plaintiffs complaint was directed against the 
commission's decision, the plaintiff was required to 
appeal that decision as directed in section 
© 2007 ThomsonAVest. No 
17-27-1001./rf. at 1237-38. 
Tf 22 As in Lund and Bennion, the plaintiffs in this 
case allege that the project contemplated by the 
municipal land use decision violated city ordinance. 
As in Lund and Bennion, however, the project 
would never have been constructed and plaintiffs' 
claims never would have arisen but for the initial 
land use decision. Therefore, consistent with Lund 
and Bennion, plaintiffs were obligated to bring their 
action under the Appeals section, section 10-9-1001 
, and to comply with the 30-day time limitation 
contained therein. 
If 23 In urging us to adopt a construction that 
allows them to proceed under the Enforcement 
section, plaintiffs rely on Culhertson v. Board of 
County Commissioners, 2001 UT 108, 44 P.3d 642. 
Culhertson, however, is readily distinguishable 
from the situation presented here. The plaintiffs in 
Culhertson brought suit against the county 
commission and developers, arguing that the 
developers' building violated the terms of a 
conditional use permit granted by the county and 
various zoning ordinances. Id. at fflf 1-10. The 
county argued that the plaintiffs had failed to 
exhaust administrative remedies as required under 
the Appeals section, section 17-27-1001. Id. at \ 
29. This court held that section 17-27-1001 did not 
apply because the plaintiffs were not challenging 
any decisions made under the CLUDMA, but 
instead were seeking to enforce decisions made 
pursuant to it, i.e., conditions specified in the 
zoning ordinance and conditional use permit. Id. at 
1fl[ 29-30. Unlike the plaintiffs in Culhertson, 
the plaintiffs in this case are not seeking to enforce 
the terms of a land use decision. Rather, they are 
seeking to challenge activities expressly authorized 
and contemplated by it. 
[7] \ 24 Having concluded that plaintiffs were 
required to satisfy the 30-day deadline specified in 
the Appeals section, we address plaintiffs' 
alternative argument that their action was timely 
because the city's failure to stop construction of the 
parking structure constitutes a continuing violation 
of city ordinance. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that 
the 30-day limitations period was extended as a 
result of this continuing violation. In so arguing, 
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plaintiffs rely on a provision of the South Jordan 
City code, which states that "[a] violation [of the 
city's zoning title] shall be deemed a separate 
offense for each day the violation exists." South 
Jordan, Utah, City Code § 12.04.090 (1998). 
f 25 We find plaintiffs' argument unpersuasive. 
The South Jordan City Council met, discussed, and 
voted on the Riverpark Site Plan on February 14, 
2001. February 14 is therefore the date on which 
the land use decision was rendered. The 
limitations provision of the Appeals section runs 
from the time the municipality "renders" a land use " 
decision," not from the time of an alleged violation. 
Plaintiffs' creative attempt to characterize the city's 
refusal to reverse its original land use decision as a 
series of subsequent decisions cannot operate to 
artificially lengthen the statutorily mandated time 
for challenging the land use decision. Having 
rejected plaintiffs' claim that their action was timely 
filed, we hold that the district court correctly 
dismissed plaintiffs' action against South Jordan. 
CONCLUSION 
1f 26 We harmonize sections 10-9-1001 and 
10-9-1002 of the Utah Code by holding that *1177 
a party seeking to challenge a municipality's land 
use decision under the Municipal Land Use 
Development and Management Act must comply 
with the requirements of section 10-9-1001. A 
party may not avoid those requirements by 
characterizing its challenge to the land use decision 
as an enforcement action under section 10-9-1002. 
The legislature has specifically addressed appeals 
from land use decisions in section 10-9-1001, 
requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies 
and imposing a 30-day deadline for challenging 
such decisions. Allowing a party to challenge a 
municipality's land use decision under section 
10-9-1002 would eviscerate the requirements and 
evident purpose of section 10-9-1001. Because 
plaintiffs' challenge to South Jordan's land use 
decision was not timely, we affirm the ruling of the 
district court. 
1f 27 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief 
Justice WILKINS, Justice DURRANT, and Justice 
NEHRING concur in Justice PARRISH's opinion. 
Utah,2004. 
Foutz v. City of South Jordan 
100 P.3d 1171, 507 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 2004 UT 75 
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Secured creditor brought action to determine 
priority of interests in collateral. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Frank G. Noel, J., 
granted summary judgment in favor of third party 
who paid off letter of credit issued to senior 
lienholder. Creditor appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that: (1) security 
interest extended to note in question, but (2) 
equitable subrogation did not apply. 
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 
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Johnson. 
Before ORME, GREENWOOD and WILKINS, JJ. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
The Mead Corporation, dba Zellerbach (Mead), 
appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of Donald William Johnson (Johnson). 
The ruling gave Johnson priority over Mead with 
regard to the accounts receivable and inventory of a 
common debtor, Graphics Reproductions 
(Graphics). We reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
This case concerns several loan transactions 
involving Graphics. On August 24, 1989, West 
One Bank (West One) extended a $50,000 
revolving line of credit to Graphics. The line of 
credit was secured by a $100,000 letter of credit 
from Wells Fargo Bank and by Graphics's inventory 
and accounts receivable. 
On that same date, West One loaned $100,000 to 
Graphics, evidenced by a promissory note. The 
$100,000 loan was secured by the same letter of 
credit from Wells Fargo. West One filed a UCC-1 
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financing statement with the State of Utah to perfect 
its security interest in Graphics's inventory and 
receivables. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-401 et 
seq. (1990). The Security Agreement executed in 
connection with the $50,000 line of credit contains 
a so-called "dragnet" clause, which states that the 
collateral secures "all Debtor's present and future 
debts, obligations and liabilities of whatever nature 
to Bank." 
*1181 Wells Fargo issued a letter of credit in favor 
of West One, at the request of its customer, the Jack 
T. Baillie and Francis B. Baillie Trust (the Trust). 
The Trust agreed to pay Wells Fargo if the letter of 
credit was drawn upon, and Johnson, in turn, agreed 
to reimburse the Trust. Johnson, who was a 
beneficiary of the Trust, was unsecured. 
Graphics later approached Mead to obtain further 
financing. On April 4, 1991, Mead inquired about 
the extent of Graphics's debt to West One. West 
One Assistant Vice President Randal Roberts 
informed Mead in writing that Graphics "has a 
$50,000 revolving line with our bank. The 
balance, at the end of banking on 4/3/91, was 
$15,000. This is secured by accounts and 
inventory." Roberts did not mention the $100,000 
outstanding loan or indicate that the inventory and 
accounts receivable was pledged as collateral for 
any debt of Graphics other than the $50,000 line of 
credit. Mead subsequently extended credit to 
Graphics, also secured by Graphics's inventory and 
accounts receivable. Mead claims it relied on the 
representation that Graphics's maximum debt 
secured by the inventory and accounts receivable 
was $50,000 when it agreed to extend credit to 
Graphics. 
On August 8, 1989, after default by Graphics, West 
One drew on the letter of credit from Wells Fargo 
and received net proceeds of $99,864. Four days 
later, on August 12, 1991, Johnson reimbursed 
Wells Fargo for the drawn-upon letter of credit. 
On about August 27, 1991, Johnson paid West One 
$1,700, the outstanding unpaid balance on the 
$50,000 revolving credit line note. West One then 
assigned its interest in the $50,000 note and the 
West One security agreement to Johnson. 
Mead filed suit against Johnson and Dixon Paper 
Company to determine the priorities of the parties' 
interests in the inventory and accounts receivable. 
Johnson counterclaimed against Mead and 
cross-claimed against Dixon Paper, claiming first 
priority. The trial court granted Johnson's motion 
for summary judgment, holding that Johnson was 
entitled to equitable subrogation to West One's 
position and therefore Johnson had a first priority 
lien on the inventory and accounts receivable, that 
Dixon Paper had a second priority lien and that 
Mead had a third priority lien. By stipulation, all 
claims involving Dixon Paper were paid from the 
available funds and dismissed. 
Mead appeals from the summary judgment in favor 
of Johnson. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
We consider two issues on appeal: 
(1) Did West One's security interest in the accounts 
receivable extend to secure the $100,000 note? 
(2) If West One's security interest did secure the 
$100,000 note, does Johnson succeed to its interest 
in the collateral by virtue of the doctrine of 
equitable subrogation? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we 
view the facts and the inferences drawn therefrom in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party 
and will affirm only if the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Dansie v. Anderson 
Lumber Co., 878 P.2d 1155, 1156 (Utah App. 1994). 
ANALYSIS 
Effect of Dragnet Clause 
[2] [3] Mead argues West One had no security 
interest in the inventory and accounts receivable to 
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which Johnson could be subrogated. Mead claims 
that the so-called "dragnet" provision FN1 
contained in the security agreement and the UCC-1 
financing statement, negotiated in connection with 
the $50,000 line of credit, was limited to the 
$50,000 line of credit and was not intended to apply 
to the $100,000 note. We disagree. 
FN1. A dragnet clause is a "[provision in 
a mortgage in which mortgagor gives 
security for past and future advances as 
well as present indebtedness." Black's 
Law Dictionary 342 (6th ed. 1990). 
*1182 [4][5] In construing a dragnet clause, we first 
attempt to determine the actual intent of the parties 
from the contractual documents and the attendant 
circumstances. Heath Tecna Corp. v. Zions First 
Nat'l Bank, 609 P.2d 1334, 1337 (Utah 1980); 
First Sec. Bank of Utah v. Shiew, 609 P.2d 952, 
956-57 (Utah 1980); see also North Park Bank of 
Commerce v. Nichols, 645 P.2d 620, 622 (Utah 
1982) (finding clear and unmistakable language of 
guarantor's written promise to secure present and 
future obligations in absence of contrary evidence 
establishes parties' intent). Moreover, "a dragnet 
lype clause will not be extended to cover future 
advances unless the advances are of the same kind 
and quality or relate to the same transaction or 
series of transactions as the principal obligation 
secured." Heath Tecna, 609 P.2d at 1337 (citations 
omitted). 
In this case, the $50,000 line of credit and the 
3J00,000 loan involved the same parties and were 
negotiated on the same day-August 24, 1989. The 
security agreement executed by Graphics in favor of 
West One in connection with the $50,000 line of 
credit was explicitly secured by Graphics's 
inventory and accounts receivable. Additionally, 
the agreement states that the described collateral is 
intended to "secure all of Debtor's present and 
future debts, obligations and liabilities of whatever 
nature to the bank ... including loans made pursuant 
to this Agreement and the Debtor's obligations 
hereunder." In addition, the UCC-1 financing 
statement executed by West One and Graphics and 
filed with the State provides: 
All of [Graphics's] inventory now owned or 
hereafter acquired and all of Debtor's rights of 
payment of money now owned or hereafter owed to 
[Graphics], whether due or to become due and 
whether or not limited to accounts, contract rights, 
chattel paper, instruments, and general intangibles, 
all of which are hereafter called "receivables," 
together with all substitutions, renewals and 
accumulations thereto, and, in each and every case, 
all proceeds of sale received therefrom or funds 
paid pursuant to the ownership thereof to secure all 
[Graphics's] present and future obligations of 
whatever nature to [West One], including all costs, 
fees and Interest. 
(emphasis added.) 
The unambiguous language of these documents 
demonstrates an intention that Graphics's inventory 
and accounts receivable secure both the $50,000 
line of credit and the $100,000 loan. The fact that 
both transactions were completed on the same day 
by the same parties strongly suggests they were 
related transactions. Moreover, the language in the 
dragnet clause stating that the collateral is intended 
to secure present or future debts "including loans 
made pursuant to this Agreement" indicates that the 
parties knew there were other loans secured by the 
inventory and accounts receivable, (emphasis 
added.) Finally, the financing statement filed by 
West One also states unequivocally that the 
inventory and receivables "secure all of the debtors 
present and future obligations of whatever nature." 
(emphasis added.) 
Thus, the $50,000 line of credit and the $100,000 
loan "relate to the same transaction or series of 
transactions." Heath Tecna, 609 P.2d at 1337. 
Therefore, we conclude that the clear language of 
the documents and the nature of the transactions 
involved establish the validity of the dragnet clause. 
Thus, West One had a perfected security interest 
in the collateral which secured the $100,000 loan. 
Equitable Subrogation 
Johnson further asserts that he is entitled to succeed 
to West One's rights in the collateral by virtue of the 
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doctrine of equitable subrogation. Subrogation is 
an equitable remedy, intended to prevent injustice 
and to force payment of a debt by " 'one who in 
justice, equity, and good conscience ought to pay it.' 
" Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Rite Way Concrete 
Forming, Inc., 742 P.2d 105, 108 (Utah App.1987) 
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988) (citation 
omitted). 
Under Utah law, ua guarantor, upon payment of the 
guaranteed obligation, has a right of subrogation to 
any collateral pledged as security." Id. Johnson 
argues that guarantors and issuers of standby letters 
of credit are, for practical purposes, identical, and 
therefore an issuer of a drawn-upon letter of credit 
is entitled to the same equitable subrogation* 1183 
rights as a guarantor.FN2 Johnson further asserts 
that he is entitled to the issuer's subrogation rights 
because he reimbursed the issuer, Wells Fargo. 
We assume, for purposes of the following 
discussion, that Johnson is correct, and therefore 
confine our discussion to whether the letter of credit 
issuer, Wells Fargo, is entitled to equitable 
subrogation to the rights of the beneficiary, West 
One. 
FN2. The issuer could claim subrogation 
to the account party's rights against the 
beneficiary, the beneficiary's rights against 
the account party, or the account party's 
rights against a third party. See John F. 
Dolan, The Law of Letters of Credit, § 
7.05 (2d ed. 1991). The importance of 
these distinctions is unclear, but the court 
in Tudor Development Group, Inc. v. 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 
968 F.2d 357, 362 n. 3 (3d Cir.1992), 
noted, "the substitution of the customer for 
the beneficiary does not require a different 
analysis or result." 
There is a division of authority on the issue of 
whether the doctrine of equitable subrogation 
should apply to letters of credit. The "majority" 
position is that subrogation is not allowed, while the 
"minority" position is that subrogation is allowed. 
Because of the split of authority and the sometimes 
confusing nature of the arguments, a brief review of 
both positions is in order. 
There are essentially four arguments advanced for, 
or against, allowing an issuer of a letter of credit 
subrogation to another's priority position. The first 
argument focuses on whether a letter of credit 
creates a true secondary obligation, as does a 
guaranty. Even if a letter of credit does create a 
primary, rather than secondary, obligation, there is 
debate over whether this distinction is significant in 
the context of equitable subrogation. Second, 
portions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
have been interpreted as supporting both positions. 
Third, the equities of the case may be balanced. 
Finally, policy considerations regarding the purpose 
and function of letters of credit are considered. An 
excellent discussion of these positions, and the 
authority for each, is contained in Tudor 
Development Group Inc. v. United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co., 968 F.2d 357 (3d Cir.1992). The 
following analysis tracks that applied by the Tudor 
court. 
a. Primary v. Secondary Obligation 
The majority position is that a letter of credit is not 
like a guaranty, because it creates a primary, rather 
than secondary, obligation, and it is therefore not 
subject to the doctrine of equitable subrogation. 
The distinction stems from the important role the " 
independence principle" plays in the function of a 
letter of credit.™3 Because of the structure of the 
letter of credit transaction, the obligation created by 
the letter is entirely independent from the 
obligations of the parties to the original transaction. 
Further, because the letter of credit obligation is 
separate from the underlying transaction, the 
defenses available against the beneficiary of the 
letter are not available to the issuer of the letter of 
credit.™4 Therefore, the beneficiary of the letter 
is protected, and "should disagreement arise 
between customer and beneficiary, the dispute is 
resolved with the money already in the pocket of the 
beneficiary." Tudor, 968 F.2d at 360. In this way, 
letters of credit serve the important purpose of 
creating certainty for the beneficiary, which allows 
some transactions which would not otherwise occur 
to proceed.™5 
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FN3. "The independence principle has 
been referred to as 'the cornerstone of the 
commercial vitality of letters of credit.' " 
In re East Texas Steel Facilities, Inc., 117 
B.R. 235, 239 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1990) 
(citations omitted). 
FN4. "Guarantors [however] may 
generally assert defenses available to the 
party whose obligation is guaranteed." 
Tudor, 968 F.2d at 368 (Becker, J., 
dissenting). 
FN5. "In large part due to the 
independence principle, letters of credit 
provide a relatively inexpensive and 
reliable mechanism to assure the 
beneficiary of prompt payment if there is 
compliance with specified documentary 
conditions." Michael Avidon, 
Subrogation in the Letter of Credit Context, 
56 Brook.L.Rev. 129, 130(1990). 
Because the obligation under a letter of credit is " 
independent" from the underlying transaction, and 
is not subject to defenses that would be available to 
the parties to the underlying transaction, it is 
sometimes said to be a "primary," rather than a " 
secondary" obligation. It is the "secondary" nature 
of a guaranty, however, which has been the 
justification for the application of the doctrine of 
*1184 equitable subrogation. Therefore, the 
argument goes, because a letter of credit is not a 
secondary obligation, equitable subrogation cannot 
apply in the letter of credit context. In this regard, 
the Tudor court argued 
the key distinction between letters of credit and 
guarantees is that the issuer's obligation under a 
letter of credit is primary whereas a guarantor's 
obligation is secondary-the guarantor is only 
obligated to pay if the principal defaults on the debt 
the principal owes. In contrast, while the issuing 
bank in the letter of credit situation may be 
secondarily liable in a temporal sense, since its 
obligation to pay does not arise until after its 
customer fails to satisfy some obligation, it is 
satisfying its own absolute and primary obligation 
to make payment rather than satisfying an 
obligation of its customer. 
Tudor, 968 F.2d at 362 (emphasis added). See also 
In re Carley Capital Group, 119 B.R. 646, 648 
(W.D.Wis.1990); In re Agrownautics, Inc., 125 
B.R. 350, 352-53 (Bankr.D.Conn.1991); In re East 
Texas Steel Facilities, Inc., 117 B.R. 235, 241 
(Bankr.N.D.Tex.1990). The Tenth Circuit has 
acknowledged this difference, albeit in the context 
of litigation over the enforcement of certain letters 
of credit. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Liberty 
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 806 F.2d 961, 968-69 (10th 
Cir.1986) (noting that the standby letter of credit is 
a "hybrid," having some characteristics of a 
guaranty but creating a "primary" obligation); 
Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Federal Deposit Ins. 
Corp., 751 F.2d 1131, 1136-37 (10th Cir.1984) 
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Federal Deposit 
Ins. Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 
426, 106 S.Ct. 1931, 90 L.Ed.2d 428 (1986) 
(acknowledging that a standby letter of credit is " 
similar in many respects" to a guaranty, but finding 
it creates a "primary" obligation). 
The minority position acknowledges the differences 
between a guaranty and a letter of credit, but argues 
that the distinction between "primary" and " 
secondary" liability is one of semantics, and is 
irrelevant to the considerations underlying the 
application of the doctrine of equitable subrogation. 
FN6
 Judge Becker's dissent in Tudor summarizes 
this analysis. In short, Judge Becker thought that " 
the relevant question is whether [the party seeking 
subrogation] was 'secondarily' liable in the sense 
that it paid the debt of another" FN7 Tudor, 968 
F.2d at 365 (Becker, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). 
FN6. The distinction between primary and 
secondary obligations as created by a 
guaranty has been acknowledged by this 
court in another context. In Mooney v. 
GR & Associates, 746 P.2d 1174 (Utah 
App.1987), the court noted "that a 
guarantor is only secondarily liable for the 
obligation he has guaranteed and, 
therefore, has defenses available to him 
that a primary obligor does not have." Id. 
at 1176 n. 2 (emphasis added). 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
907 P.2d 1179 Page 7 
907 P.2d 1179, 29 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 1291 
(Cite as: 907 P.2d 1179) 
FN7. This position finds support from 
White and Summers, who note that "the 
standby letter of credit acts as a 'back up' 
against applicant default on obligations of 
all kinds, both monetary and 
non-monetary. Standby letters function 
somewhat like guaranties, for it is 
applicant's failing that prompts 
beneficiary's call on the letter." James J. 
White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform 
Commercial Code, § 26-1(b), p. 108 (4th 
ed. 1995). 
By way of explanation, Judge Becker argued that: 
[w]hen a standby credit supporting a loan is 
honored, the issuer admittedly is satisfying its 
obligation as a primary obligor to honor the standby 
credit, but at the same time it is in fact satisfying a 
debt for which a person other than the issuer is 
primarily liable.... 
[T]he notion that an issuer's obligation to honor the 
letter of credit is a "primary obligation" should be 
interpreted to mean that, under the independence 
principle, the issuer may not avoid its obligation to 
honor the credit by identifying deficiencies in 
underlying contracts or by otherwise asserting 
defenses that are typically available to parties who 
are generally considered to be "secondarily liable" 
such as guarantors and sureties. Thus ... the " 
primary obligation" language in the letter of credit 
context concerns itself with the issuer's ability to 
avoid honoring its letter of credit, whereas the " 
primary liability" language in the subrogation 
context concerns itself with whether the entity, after 
reducing a claim of a creditor, received the 
consideration from the creditor. 
*1185 Tudor, 968 F.2d at 365-66 (Becker, J., 
dissenting) (quoting In re Valley Vue Joint Venture, 
123 B.R. 199, 204, 206 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1991)) 
(emphasis added); see also White & Summers, 
supra note 7, § 26-15, at 213 (agreeing with Judge 
Becker that "the independence principle should not 
be a conclusive bar to subrogation"). Put more 
succinctly, the importance of the "independence 
principle" is that it prevents the issuer of the letter 
of credit from asserting certain defenses which 
would hinder prompt payment, therefore 
undermining the purpose behind issuing a letter of 
credit. Once payment is made, however, the 
independence principle has served its purpose, and 
the application of the independence principle to 
avoid equitable subrogation is not necessary to 
preserve the value of the independence principle. FN8 
Accordingly, once payment is made, the 
distinction between primary and secondary 
obligations becomes irrelevant. 
FN8. Even the majority opinion in Tudor 
agreed with this argument, noting that "the 
vitality of the independence principle is 
unlikely to be substantially diminished 
were we to allow subrogation in this 
situation." Tudor, 968 F.2d at 363. The 
Tudor majority therefore based its decision 
on the fact that a different element of 
equitable subrogation was not met-that the 
party seeking subrogation satisfied the debt 
of another-because the obligation was 
primary, not secondary. Id. 
b.UCC 
Various cryptic statements in the comments to the 
UCC make reference to letters of credit and 
guaranties.™9 These statements have been cited 
as supporting both sides of the debate over the 
subrogation of letters of credit. Unfortunately, 
these references cloud, rather than clear, the issue. 
FN9. Although Utah did not adopt the 
comments to the UCC when it enacted the 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code, Utah 
courts have cited the comments for 
guidance in interpreting provisions of the 
Code. See Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); House v. 
Armour of America, Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 
554 (Utah App.1994) cert, granted, 899 
P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). 
Some commentary is construed as supporting the 
majority position. The comment to section 5-101 
notes that "[t]he other source of law respecting 
letters of credit is the law of contracts with 
occasional unfortunate excursions into the law of 
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guaranty." U.C.C. § 5-101 official cmt. (1991). 
The comment to 5-103 notes that "[t]he issuer is not 
a guarantor of the performance of these underlying 
transactions." Id. § 5-103 official cmt. (1991). 
The comment to 5-109 notes that the "issuer 
receives compensation for a payment service rather 
than for a guaranty of performance." Id. § 5-109 
official cmt. (1991). These comments have been 
relied upon in reaching the majority position, and 
denying equitable subrogation. See Tudor, 968 
F.2d at 362; In re Carley Capital Group, 119 B.R. 
at 650; In re Agrownautics, Inc., 125 B.R. at 353; 
In re East Texas Steel Facilities, Inc., 117 B.R. at 
241 n. 3. 
However, the comment to section 5-109 of the UCC 
also contains one direct reference to equitable 
subrogation, noting that "[t]he customer will 
normally have direct recourse against the 
beneficiary if performance fails, whereas the issuer 
will have such recourse only by assignment or in a 
proper case subrogation to the rights of the 
customer." mxQ U.C.C. § 5-109 official cmt. 
(1991) (emphasis added). This comment has been 
relied upon in rejecting the majority position, and 
concluding that the UCC allows equitable 
subrogation in the letter of credit context. See 
Tudor, 968 F.2d at 367 (Becker, J., dissenting). 
FN 10. Confusion also stems from the 
ambiguity of the phrase "in a proper case." 
The Tudor majority resolved this issue by 
finding that this reference was "clearly 
limited to the possibility of the issuer being 
subrogated to the customer's rights against 
the beneficiary," and noted that the case 
before the court involved subrogation 
against a stranger to the letter of credit 
rather than the beneficiary. Tudor, 968 
F.2d at 362-363; see supra note 2, 
discussing the various parties to which the 
issuer may be subrogated. In addition, the 
Tudor court noted that this comment was 
suggestive, rather than mandatory. Tudor, 
968F.2dat363. 
Judge Becker argues that citation to snippets of 
comments to the UCC is inappropriate because 
© 2007 ThomsonAVest. No 
these references are made with the goal of 
preserving the integrity of the independence 
principle, not to defeating the application of 
equitable subrogation. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting). 
Therefore, the true test is whether allowing 
equitable subrogation*1186 would undermine the 
independence principle. Judge Becker argues that 
the independence principle will be preserved as 
long as "the issuer [pays] first, without looking 
through to the underlying transaction.... Once the 
issuer has done so, ... the purpose of the 
independence principle has been served: the 
beneficiary has the money." Id. at 368. 
Furthermore, allowing subrogation would not 
discourage issuers from honoring letters of credit 
because it would place them in a more secure 
position than if they were not subrogated. 
Conversely, "the un availability of subsequent 
subrogation might discourage issuers from honoring 
the letters because they would have one less means 
of obtaining reimbursement." Id. 
Many commentators believe the appropriate 
solution is through legislation. F N U To that end, 
the recently revised model UCC attempts to resolve 
the issue by revising section 5-117 to provide as 
follows: 
FN11. Tudor, 968 F.2d at 369 (Becker, J., 
dissenting) (concluding that a statutory 
resolution would be the "best solution"); 
Avidon, supra note 5, at 137 (noting that 
legislation would be "useful"). 
(a) An issuer that honors a beneficiary's 
presentation is subrogated to the rights of the 
beneficiary to the same extent as if the issuer were 
a secondary obligor of the underlying obligation 
owed to the beneficiary and of the applicant to the 
same extent as if the issuer were the secondary 
obligor of the underlying obligation owed to the 
applicant. 
(b) An applicant that reimburses an issuer is 
subrogated to the rights of an issuer against any 
beneficiary, presenter, or nominated person to the 
same extent as if the applicant were the secondary 
obligor of the obligations owed to the issuer and 
has the rights of subrogation of the issuer to the 
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rights of the beneficiary stated in subsection (a) 
(d) Notwithstanding any agreement or term to the 
contrary, the rights of subrogation stated in 
subsection (a) and (b) do not arise until the issuer 
honors the letter of credit or otherwise pays.... 
(quoted in White & Summers, supra note 7, § 
26-15(a), at 213-14) (emphasis added). As White 
and Summers note, this provision, along with the 
comments thereto, specifically endorses the position 
of Judge Becker, discussed above. Id. Utah, 
however, has not adopted revised section 5-117. 
c. The Equities 
Courts often discuss the equities of the case in 
reaching their decisions. See, e.g., Tudor, 968 F.2d 
at 363-64; In re Agrownautics, 125 B.R. at 352-53; 
In re Carley Capital Group, 119 B.R. at 649-50; 
In re Valley Vue Joint Venture, 123 B.R. 199, 206, 
208 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1991). Each court applies a 
different analysis, determined largely by the facts of 
the case. The Tudor case is once again illustrative. 
In Tudor, the majority opinion analyzed the 
equities, applying a three-part test. First, the court 
examined the position of the party claiming 
subrogation, specifically considering the ability to 
bargain for the rights received. Tudor, 968 F.2d at 
363. Second, the majority examined the other 
parties who would be affected by the application of 
equitable subrogation, in order to determine if they 
would receive "detrimental" treatment. Id. at 364. 
Finally, the court noted that an adequate remedy at 
law existed, and that therefore equitable relief was 
not appropriate. Id. 
The first consideration, that the issuer of a letter of 
credit can and should protect itself by contract, has 
support in Utah case law. This court has noted, in 
the context of applying equitable subrogation to a 
mechanics' lien: 
[T]he fact there have been few equitable 
subrogation cases before the courts in recent years 
underscores the argument that commercially 
sophisticated lenders should protect themselves in 
contract. Commercial lenders can easily examine 
the property, ask specific questions regarding the 
existence of intervening lienholders, acquire 
subordination agreements with any lienholders that 
exist, or, in many cases, assume the rights of the 
earlier lender by assignment. 
Richards v. Security Pac. Natl Bank, 849 P.2d 606, 
612 (Utah App.) cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 
1993) (emphasis added). 
*1187 Indeed, there is a good argument for letting 
the marketplace control the details of these 
transactions, rather than the courts. As White and 
Summers note, "[m]any bankers have rued the day 
they issued a standby letter without assessing and 
treating it as a true loan or without taking solid 
collateral as security." White & Summers, supra 
note 7, § 26-1(b), at 110. In light of these 
developments, "[b]ank regulators eventually awoke 
to bring standby letters squarely within a bank's 
loan-booking requirements and all lending limits." 
/</. a t l lOn. 18. 
However, Judge Becker's response to the argument 
that issuers are contractually able to protect 
themselves is also persuasive: 
Generally applied, the same argument would 
virtually eliminate equitable subrogation altogether, 
for it would apply to every guaranty or suretyship 
contract. Moreover, in many cases this may lead to 
the customer receiving an undeserved windfall. A 
customer may default on both its obligation on the 
underlying transaction and its obligation to 
reimburse the issuer of the letter of credit, yet retain 
any income deriving from the original transaction. 
In short, the issuer's ability to protect itself may be a 
strong equity against it, as is the fact that it receives 
a fee for its services, but countervailing equities 
may outweigh these considerations in certain cases. 
Tudor, 968 F.2d at 369 (Becker, J., dissenting). 
The second consideration, viewing the assumptions 
of the other parties affected, and determining 
whether the application of equitable subrogation 
would be detrimental to their interests appears to 
involve a case-by-case analysis. Possible factors 
include the sophistication of the other parties, their 
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expectations or assumptions, or the extent to which 
they had knowledge of the issuer's role in the 
transaction 
The third consideration, that an equitable remedy is 
only available where there is no remedy at law, also 
has support in Utah case law "The right to an 
equitable remedy is an exceptional one, and absent 
statutory mandate, equitable relief should be 
granted only when a court determines that damages 
are inadequate and that equitable relief will result in 
more perfect and complete justice" Thurston v 
Box Elder County, 892 P 2d 1034, 1040 (Utah 
1995) Judge Becker, however, found such cases 
distinguishable and noted that he had not "found 
any case from Pennsylvania or any other state that 
denies equitable subrogation on the ground of 
adequate remedies at law " Tudor, 968 F 2d at 370 
(Becker, J , dissenting) (emphasis added) 
d Additional Considerations 
Practical considerations underlie all of the 
approaches already discussed, at least to some 
degree Certainly, the most important 
consideration is the effect allowing equitable 
subrogation may have on the issuance of letters of 
credit Judge Becker once again provides a 
succinct analysis of the problem 
If courts allow traditional equitable subrogation, the 
transaction costs m negotiating letters of credit may 
be lower than under a rule where the parties must 
specify subrogation rights contractually 
On the other hand, with the law as unsettled as it 
now is, prudent would-be issuers may already have 
reacted by demandmg greater fees or security, and 
the system appears to be functioning well Parties 
may even be willing to incorporate the entire body 
of equity jurisprudence by contractual reference 
Perhaps in the long run, the rule that the majority 
adopts [denying subrogation] will not make much of 
a difference, as good lawyers and prudent issuers 
will react accordmgly I concede too that a 
bright-line no-subrogation rule would promote legal 
certainty and thereby reduce litigation costs 
Tudor, 968 F 2d at 369 (Becker, J , dissenting) 
© 2007 Thomson/West No 
Another concern, identified by Judge Becker, is the 
value of a clear rule, versus the value of an 
equitable approach which can be applied on a 
case-by-case basis One author's "opinion is that it 
is less important whether the particular rule adopted 
prohibits or permits subrogation than that the rule 
be stated clearly " Avidon, supra note 5, at 137 
*1188 However, others argue that the best approach 
is to retain subrogation, but apply it on a 
case-by-case basis, under an equity analysis In his 
dissent m Tudor, Judge Becker concluded that "on 
balance the better rule is to retain subrogation on 
a case-by-case basis and apply it sparingly " Tudor, 
968 F 2d at 369 (Becker, J , dissenting) It seems 
clear that "[permitting subrogation claims in 
appropriate cases would provide courts with an 
equitable way to reallocate the 'windfall' that 
results when one of the parties to the transaction 
fails to perform its obligations" Avidon, supra 
note 5, at 137 A good argument can be made that 
this is exactly what the comment to section 5-109 of 
the UCC means when it says subrogation is 
appropriate in the "proper case " Finally, such an 
approach would be consistent with the position this 
court took when it noted that "[t]he equitable nature 
of the doctrine [of equitable subrogation] prevents 
articulation of an unwavering rule that applies in all 
cases" Richards, 849 P 2d at 609 (citations 
omitted) 
e This Court's View 
[6][7][8] [9] We are persuaded that the majority 
position denying subrogation on letters of credit is 
the better position, for all the reasons discussed, 
most notably, for the certainty it promotes 
Subrogation is an equitable remedy to be applied 
only to prevent clear injustice and is not appropriate 
in standby letter of credit transactions A typical 
issuer of a standby letter of credit is entitled to 
immediate reimbursement from its customer under 
the UCC, see Utah Code Ann § 70A-5-114(3) 
(1990), and can further secure its position with 
appropriate documentation™12 Additionally, we 
believe the legislative arena is better suited to 
address the issue m a uniform manner which would 
provide advance notice to those affected We 
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therefore hold that the issuer of a letter of credit is 
not entitled to equitable subrogation and, as a result, 
Johnson is not entitled to such rights.™13 
FN 12. Johnson is in a somewhat unusual 
position, as he agreed to reimburse the 
customer of the issuer Johnson was, m 
fact, related to a principal of Graphics, the 
beneficiary's borrower 
FN 13 Because our decision on the 
equitable subrogation issue is dispositive, 
we do not decide whether there are 
material issues of fact on the issue of 
estoppel which would preclude summary 
judgment Likewise, our decision that 
Johnson is not entitled to rights in the 
collateral mandates that he is not entitled 
to recover costs or attorney fees from that 
collateral 
CONCLUSION 
The so-called "dragnet" clause in the security 
agreement between West One and Graphics granted 
West One a security interest in the inventory and 
accounts receivable of Graphics for both the 
$50,000 line of credit and the $100,000 note. 
However, Johnson may not claim equitable 
subrogation to the rights of West One in the 
collateral Equitable subrogation is not available to 
the issuer of a letter of credit Accordingly, 
Johnson, who claims to stand in the shoes of West 
One, may not claim priority to the collateral over 
Mead 
We reverse and remand for proceedmgs consistent 
with this opinion 
ORME, P.J., and WILKINS, J., concur. 
Utah App., 1995. 
Mead Corp. v. Dixon Paper Co. 
907 P.2d 1179, 29 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 1291 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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H 
State v. BrooksUtah,1995. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Corey Lynn BROOKS, Defendant and Petitioner. 
No. 940146. 
Nov. 27, 1995. 
Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Kenneth Rigtrup, J., of aggravated 
robbery and aggravated burglary on charges arising 
out of same incident, and he appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, 868 P.2d 818, affirmed convictions on 
the merits and refused to address defendant's 
argument that he was being punished twice for same 
crime. After granting petition for certiorari, the 
Supreme Court, Zimmerman, C.J., held that: (1) 
rules of criminal procedure permit Court of Appeals 
to consider legality of sentence even if issue is 
raised for first time on appeal; but (2) Court of 
Appeals properly refused to consider request to 
correct sentence where substance of appeal was 
challenge to underlying conviction on basis that he 
had impermissibly been punished twice for same 
crime; and (3) aggravated robbery was not lesser 
included offense of aggravated burglary. 
Affirmed. 
Stewart, Associate C.J., and Howe, J., concurred in 
the result. 
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Remedy. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 110k996(l)) 
Court of Appeals properly refused to consider 
defendant's request to correct his sentence under 
Rules of Criminal Procedure where substance of 
appeal was challenge by defendant to underlying 
conviction on basis that he had impermissibly been 
punished twice for same crime through convictions 
for both aggravated burglary and aggravated 
robbery. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 22(e). 
[12] Criminal Law 110€^>1030(1) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
110XXIV(E)1 In General 
110kl030 Necessity of Objections in 
General 
110kl030(l) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Finding of "plain error" requires that error 
occurred, that error was obvious, and that error was 
harmful; if any one of elements is missing, there 
can be no finding of "plain error." 
[13] Double Jeopardy 135H €=^145 
135H Double Jeopardy 
135HV Offenses, Elements, and Issues 
Foreclosed 
135HV(A) In General 
135Hkl39 Particular Offenses, Identity of 
135Hkl45 k. Robbery. Most Cited 
Cases 
Defendant's convictions for aggravated burglary and 
aggravated robbery arising from same conduct did 
not constitute impermissible multiple punishment 
and did not violate double jeopardy clause; charge 
of aggravated burglary required proof that 
defendant entered or remained in building, and 
aggravated robbery required proof that defendant 
took another's property. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5; 
Const. Art. 1, § 12; U.C.A.1953, 76-1-402(3), 
76-6-203, 76-6-302. 
[14] Criminal Law 110 €^>29(2) 
110 Criminal Law 
1101 Nature and Elements of Crime 
110k29 Different Offenses in Same 
Transaction 
110k29(2) k. Conviction of Lesser or 
Included Offenses. Most Cited Cases 
Conviction of defendant for two offenses arising out 
of single criminal episode is barred where one 
offense is lesser included offense of the other; 
offense is "lesser included offense" when proof of 
one crime necessarily proves all of elements of 
second crime. U.C.A.1953, 76-1-402(3). 
[15] Indictment and Information 210 €=^189(1) 
210 Indictment and Information 
210XIII Included Offenses 
210k 189 Lesser Grade or Degree of Offense 
Charged 
210kl89(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Under two-step analysis for determining if one 
crime is lesser included offense of another, first step 
is theoretical comparison of statutory elements of 
each offense, and if due to variations in statutory 
elements, two crimes would be separate under one 
set of circumstances but lesser included offenses 
under another, court must then look at evidence 
actually presented at trial to determine which of 
statutory variations were proved and whether those 
variations created lesser included relationship 
between two charged crimes; only if first test does 
not resolve question must court proceed to second 
step. U.C.A.1953, 76-1-402(3). 
[16] Indictment and Information 210 €^>191(9) 
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210 Indictment and Information 
210XIII Included Offenses 
210kl91 Different Offense Included in 
Offense Charged 
210kl91(9) k. Charge of Robbery. Most 
Cited Cases 
Simple theft is lesser included offense of simple 
robbery, as proof of robbery will always satisfy 
elements of theft. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-404; 
U.C.A.1953, 76-6-301 (1994). 
[17] Indictment and Information 210 €^191(1) 
210 Indictment and Information 
210XIII Included Offenses 
210kl91 Different Offense Included in 
Offense Charged 
210kl91(l) k. Charge of Adultery. Most 
Cited Cases 
Simple theft is never lesser included offense of 
simple assault. U.C.A.1953, 76-5-102, 76-6-404. 
[18] Indictment and Information 210 €^191(2) 
210 Indictment and Information 
210XIII Included Offenses 
210kl91 Different Offense Included in 
Offense Charged 
210kl91(2) k. Charge of Burglary. Most 
Cited Cases 
Aggravated robbery is never lesser included offense 
of aggravated burglary; each crime has unique 
element, as aggravated burglary always requires 
proof that defendant entered or remained in 
building, and aggravated robbery always requires 
proof that defendant took another's property. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-6-203, 76-6-302. 
Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., J. Kevin Murphy, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City, for defendant. 
ON CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF 
APPEALS 
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice: 
After a jury trial, Corey Lynn Brooks was convicted 
of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in 
violation of section 76-6-302 of the Utah Code, and 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim 
Page 4 
aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, in 
violation of section 76-6-203 of the Utah Code. 
Brooks appealed his convictions, and we poured the 
appeal to the court of appeals. There, Brooks 
asserted that the trial court erred in not removing 
*858 certain jurors for cause and that his trial 
counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Brooks 
also argued that because the convictions for robbery 
and burglary arose out of the same operative facts, 
one was the lesser included crime of the other and 
to convict and sentence him for both amounted to 
punishing him twice for the same crime. He asked 
that his "illegal sentence" be set aside. 
The court of appeals affirmed the convictions on the 
merits, addressing Brooks' first two arguments but 
refusing to address his argument that he was being 
punished twice for the same crime. State v. Brooks, 
868 P.2d 818 (Utah Ct.App.1994). We granted 
Brooks' petition for a writ of certiorari to address 
the court of appeals' refusal to consider the 
lesser-included-offense issue. 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 
1994). We affirm. 
Responding to an advertisement offering a diamond 
ring for sale, Brooks went to the home of Stephanie 
and Martha Vert. Brooks said he wanted to 
purchase the ring and would come back the next 
morning. When Brooks arrived, Stephanie, who 
was home alone, let him in. Brooks came in, 
picked up the diamond ring, pointed a pistol at 
Stephanie, and forced her into the bathroom, where 
he ordered her to handcuff herself to the pipes 
under the sink. Brooks then rummaged through the 
house, took several thousand dollars worth of 
jewelry, including the diamond ring, and fled the 
scene. He was eventually apprehended when 
friends to whom he had boasted about the robbery 
turned him in. 
Brooks' first trial resulted in a hung jury. After a 
second trial, a jury convicted him of aggravated 
robbery and aggravated burglary. The trial court 
sentenced Brooks on both convictions but ordered 
that the sentences be served concurrently and also 
ordered him to pay fines and restitution.™1 
FN1. For a more complete recitation of the 
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facts, see State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 
819-21 (Ct.App.), cert, granted, 883 P.2d 
1359 (Utah 1994). 
Brooks appealed the convictions on the three 
grounds mentioned above, all of which were raised 
for the first time on appeal. The court of appeals 
addressed only Brooks' first two arguments, both of 
which it found meritless. Brooks, 868 P.2d at 
823-26. 
[1] Brooks' third contention before the court of 
appeals was that "his convictions for robbery and 
burglary illegally punishfed] him twice for the same 
crime." Id. at 821. He argued that burglary and 
robbery were in a lesser included relationship 
because on the facts, he could not have committed 
one without necessarily committing the other. 
Under our statutes and case law, one cannot be 
convicted of both a stated crime and a lesser crime 
that is necessarily included in the proof of the 
greater. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3); see, e.g., 
State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 877 (Utah 1985) 
(per curiam); State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 
1983). Therefore, Brooks argued, his conviction 
and sentence for both burglary and robbery were 
illegal. Brooks, 868 P.2d at 826. He asserted that 
under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e), 
which provides that "[t]he court may correct an 
illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner, at any time," the court of appeals could 
correct his illegal sentence even though the issue 
was raised for the first time on appeal. 
The court of appeals refused to address this issue 
because it concluded that rule 22(e) does not allow 
an appellate court to address an illegal sentence for 
the first time on appeal. Brooks, 868 P.2d at 826. 
The court relied on State v. Gallegos, 849 P.2d 586, 
591-92 (Utah Ct.App. 1993), for the proposition that 
despite rule 22(e)'s apparently open language, it 
grants continuing jurisdiction only to trial courts to 
correct an illegal sentence "at any time." Because 
it concluded that Brooks still had a remedy in the 
trial court, the court of appeals also declined to 
address the legality of Brooks' conviction and 
sentence under either a plain error analysis or an 
ineffective assistance of counsel analysis. Brooks, 
868 P.2d at 826 n. 11. Brooks sought a writ of 
Page 5 
certiorari, and we granted the petition to consider 
the court of appeals' refusal to address the legality 
of Brooks' sentence. 
[2][3][4][5] We first state the applicable standard of 
review. The standard of review for a *859 simple 
legal interpretation of a rule or statute is 
correctness. "Legal determinations ... are defined 
as those which are not of fact but are essentially of 
rules or principles uniformly applied to persons of 
similar qualities and status in similar circumstances. 
" State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). 
When reviewing legal determinations, an "appellate 
court decides the matter for itself and does not defer 
in any degree to the trial judge's determination of 
law." Id. at 936. The same standard applies when 
we review a court of appeals decision on such a 
question. See Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 
P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990) ("We accord no 
particular deference to conclusions of law, whether 
made by the trial court or the court of appeals, but 
review such conclusions for correctness."). 
We conclude that the court of appeals erred in 
holding that it lacked the authority under rule 22(e) 
to address a claim of an illegal sentence for the first 
time on appeal. However, we also conclude that an 
appellate court may not review the legality of a 
sentence under rule 22(e) when the substance of the 
appeal is, as it is here, a challenge, not to the 
sentence itself, but to the underlying conviction. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the court of appeals 
did not err in refusing to decide whether Brooks 
was illegally sentenced. 
In holding that it lacked the authority to address for 
the first time on appeal the claim of an illegal 
sentence, the court of appeals relied on its earlier 
decision in Gallegos, which, in turn, interpreted our 
decision in State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86 (Utah 1991) 
^Babbel II "). Understanding why the court of 
appeals panel's reliance on Gallegos was misplaced 
in the instant case requires some explanation. 
Gallegos was convicted of four counts of 
distributing or arranging to distribute a controlled 
substance. Because of prior convictions for the 
same crime, his sentences were enhanced by reason 
of section 58-37-8(l)(b) of the Utah Code. 
Gallegos, 849 P.2d at 588, 591. Gallegos appealed 
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the enhanced penalties. He stated that his prior 
convictions, upon which the enhancements were 
based, were still under appeal. On this factual 
ground, he argued that he should not have had his 
second set of sentences enhanced before the first set 
of appeals was concluded because if the first set of 
convictions were overturned, he would have no way 
to challenge the enhancements later on. The court 
of appeals rejected this argument, holding that 
Gallegos could petition the trial court for 
resentencing under rule 22(e) if the prior 
convictions were overturned. Id. at 591-92. To 
support its holding, the Gallegos court cited this 
court's decision in Babbel II for the proposition that 
rule 22(e) gives the trial court continuing 
jurisdiction to correct illegal sentences at any time. 
Id. 
[6] We conclude that in Gallegos, the court of 
appeals correctly applied Babbel II We did state 
there that a trial court can always correct an illegal 
sentence. The confusion arose when the court of 
appeals panel in the instant case read Gallegos to 
have interpreted Babbel II as implicitly denying that 
an appellate court could also address an illegal 
sentence claim raised for the first time on appeal. 
See Brooks, 868 P.2d at 826. This was a 
misreading of Gallegos and of Babbel II 
The court of appeals' misinterpretation of Gallegos 
and Babbel II rested on our statement in Babbel II 
that "[rule 22(e) ] specifically provides that because 
an illegal sentence is void, a trial court may correct 
an illegal sentence at any time." 813 P.2d at 88 
(emphasis added); see Gallegos, 849 P.2d at 591-92 
(citing Babbel II ). However, Babbel II must be 
read in context. Babbel appealed his convictions 
for aggravated sexual assault and aggravated 
kidnaping. Although the state had not raised the 
issue before the trial court or in its brief before this 
court, at oral argument it asserted that the sentences 
imposed for Babbel's convictions were improper 
because the trial court had relied on sentencing 
guidelines that treated Babbel's convictions as 
routine felonies rather than on then newly 
established and more severe minimum mandatory 
sentencing guidelines applicable in kidnaping and 
sexual abuse cases. We addressed the issue raised 
for the first time on appeal, and although affirming 
Babbel's convictions, we vacated the sentences 
because they were plainly unlawful. State v. 
Babbell, 110 P.2d 987, 993-94 (Utah 1989) *860 (" 
Babbell I "). We remanded the case for 
resentencing. 
Babbel appealed again after his resentencing, 
claiming that the more severe sentences imposed 
under the new guidelines violated statutory law and 
the double jeopardy clauses of the state and federal 
constitutions. Babbel IIf 813 P.2d at 87-88. We 
upheld the new sentences, stating that double 
jeopardy does not prohibit the correction of an 
illegal sentence even if the new sentence is more 
severe than the previously imposed illegal sentence. 
Id. at 88-89. We also stated in the course of our 
discussion that trial courts have the power to correct 
an illegal sentence "at any time, whether before or 
after an appeal, and even if there is no appeal." Id. 
at 88. In so stating, however, we did not indicate 
that the fact that a trial court has this continuing 
jurisdiction in any way suggested that an appellate 
court lacked such power. 
[7] [8] [9] Contrary to the apparent assumption of the 
court of appeals in this case, Babbel II does not 
stand for the proposition that under rule 22(e), an 
appellate court is precluded from reviewing a claim 
that a sentence is illegal if the issue is raised for the 
first time on appeal. In fact, taken together, Babbel 
I and Babbel II, like the sweeping language of rule 
22(e), suggest just the opposite. When a sentence 
is patently illegal, an appellate court can vacate the 
illegal sentence without first remanding the case to 
the trial court, even if the matter was never raised 
before. This makes theoretical sense because an 
illegal sentence is void and, like issues of 
jurisdiction, should be raisable at any time. This 
view of the matter is also supported by 
considerations of judicial economy. When the 
pertinent facts are undisputed and a purely legal 
question with respect to which the trial court has no 
discretion remains to be decided, nothing is to be 
gained by remanding the case to the trial court. See 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 936 ("[AJppellate courts have ... 
the power and duty to say what the law is...."). 
Accordingly, we hold that rule 22(e) permits the 
court of appeals to consider the legality of a 
sentence even if the issue is raised for the first time 
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on appeal. 
[10][11] Nonetheless, we conclude that the court of 
appeals did not err in refusing to consider Brooks' 
request to correct his sentence under rule 22(e) 
because rule 22(e) does not allow an appellate court 
to review the legality of a sentence when the 
substance of the appeal is not a challenge to the 
sentence itself, but to the underlying conviction. A 
request to correct an illegal sentence under rule 
22(e) presupposes a valid conviction. See United 
States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506, 74 S.Ct. 247, 
250, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954); (interpreting analogous 
federal rule); United States v. Pavlico, 961 F.2d 
440, 443 (4th Cir.1992) (same); State v. Meier, 440 
N.W.2d 700, 703 (N.D.1989) (interpreting 
analogous state rule); In re Brockmueller, 374 
N.W.2d 135, 138 (S.D.1985) (same). Therefore, 
issues concerning the validity of a conviction are 
not cognizable under rule 22(e). See Pavlico, 961 
F.2d at 443; Meier, 440 N.W.2d at 703. 
To elaborate, Brooks' argument before the court of 
appeals was that under the facts of this case, 
burglary and robbery occupied a lesser included 
relationship to each other and, therefore, that "his 
convictions for robbery and burglary illegally 
punish[ed] him twice for the same crime." Brooks, 
868 P.2d at 821. In substance, then, Brooks' 
appeal is no different from the run-of-the-mill case 
in which an appellate court sets aside a defendant's 
conviction for a lesser included offense and, as a 
result, his or her sentence is necessarily voided. 
See, e.g., Bradley, 752 P.2d at 877; Hill, 674 P.2d 
at 98. Such a challenge is not to the legality of the 
sentence but to the conviction of the lesser included 
offense. Because rule 22(e) did not empower the 
court of appeals to review Brooks' lesser included 
conviction, that court did not err in refusing to 
address it. 
Brooks also asked the court of appeals to review his 
claim of an illegal sentence under either a plain 
error analysis or an ineffective assistance of counsel 
analysis. The court of appeals refused to do so 
because it concluded that Brooks still had a remedy 
in the trial court under rule 22(e). Brooks, 868 
P.2d at 826 n. 11. However, as we stated above, 
rule 22(e) does not allow a court to review a claim 
of an illegal sentence when the substance of *861 
the claim is, as it is here, a challenge to the 
underlying conviction. Because the court of 
appeals based its decision not to address Brooks' 
plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel 
arguments on its incorrect belief that rule 22(e) 
provided a remedy at the trial court level, we could 
remand the matter to the court of appeals to address 
these two arguments. However, considerations of 
judicial economy suggest that we dispose of these 
issues ourselves. We therefore turn to the merits of 
Brooks' claims of plain error and ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
[12] We first address Brooks' contention that his 
conviction for both aggravated burglary and 
aggravated robbery is reviewable as plain error. A 
finding of plain error requires that (i) an error 
occurred; (ii) the error was obvious; and (iii) the 
error was harmful. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 
403 (Utah 1994) (citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1208 (Utah 1993)). "If any one of these 
elements is missing, there can be no finding of plain 
error." Id. 
[13] Here, we can dispose of Brooks' challenge 
under the first element. Brooks argues that when 
the State proved facts sufficient to convict him of 
aggravated burglary, it necessarily also proved all 
of the elements of aggravated robbery. Since proof 
of the greater crime necessarily proved the lesser, 
Brooks claims, to sentence him for both crimes 
violated section 76-1-402(3) of the Utah Code, as 
well as the double jeopardy prohibitions in both 
article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the 
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
We conclude that Brooks was validly convicted of 
both offenses. 
[14] As suggested earlier, section 76-1-402(3) bars 
the conviction of a defendant for two offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode when one is 
a lesser included offense of the other.FN2 Such an 
offense is lesser included when proof of one crime 
necessarily proves all of the elements of the second 
crime. State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235-36 
(Utah 1990) (citing Blockburger v. United States, 
284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 
(1932)). 
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FN2. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) states 
in pertinent part: 
A defendant may be convicted of an 
offense included in the offense charged but 
may not be convicted of both the offense 
charged and the included offense. An 
offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or 
less than all the facts required to establish 
the commission of the offense charged.... 
[15] [16] [17] Determining when one crime is a 
lesser included offense of another can occasionally 
be difficult. We have adopted a two-step analysis 
for resolving this issue. As we explained in Hill 
61A P.2d at 97, the first step is a purely theoretical 
comparison of the statutory elements of each 
offense. In most situations, this is sufficient to 
determine whether a lesser included relationship 
exists between two crimes. For example, simple 
theft, which requires "obtaining] or exercis[ing] 
unauthorized control over the property of another," 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404, is a lesser included 
offense of simple robbery, which requires the u 
unlawful and intentional taking of personal property 
... by means of force or fear." Id. § 76-6-301. 
Proof of robbery will always satisfy the elements of 
theft. On the other hand, simple theft is never a 
lesser included offense of simple assault, which 
requires "an attempt ... [,] a threat ... [,] or an act ... 
that causes or creates a substantial risk of bodily 
injury to another." Id. § 76-5-102. 
However, some criminal statutes describe the 
elements of a crime by a listing of variations in the 
elements. Under some of these variations, two 
crimes would be separate under one set of 
circumstances but lesser included offenses under 
another. Hill 674 P.2d at 97. Where such 
variations exist and there is a theoretical possibility 
of a lesser included relationship, a second analytical 
step must be taken. The court must look at the 
evidence actually presented at trial to determine 
which of the statutory variations were proved and 
whether those variations created a lesser included 
relationship between the two charged crimes. Id. 
[18] With this background, we address Brooks' 
claim. The first step of the Hill analysis asks 
whether we can categorically say that aggravated 
burglary and aggravated *862 robbery will never 
have a lesser included relationship. Only if this test 
does not resolve the question need we proceed to 
the second analytical step. We first address 
aggravated burglary. A person commits burglary if 
the actor "enters or remains unlawfully in a building 
... with intent to commit a felony." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-202. A person commits aggravated 
burglary if "in attempting, committing, or fleeing 
from a burglary the actor ... causes bodily injury to 
any person who is not a participant in the crime; 
uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous 
weapon ...; or possesses or attempts to use any 
explosive or dangerous weapon." Id. § 76-6-203. 
We next address the second charge, aggravated 
robbery. "Robbery is the unlawful and intentional 
taking of personal property in the possession of 
another from [their] person, or immediate presence, 
against [their] will, accomplished by means of force 
or fear." Id. § 76-6-301. "A person commits 
aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, [the actor] uses or threatens to use a 
dangerous weapon ...; causes serious bodily injury 
upon another; or takes an operable motor vehicle." 
Id. § 76-6-302. 
Having described the elements of these two 
offenses, we ask whether proof of the elements of 
aggravated burglary ever prove all the elements of 
aggravated robbery. The answer is no. While 
there are elements common to both crimes, such as 
use of a deadly weapon, each has a unique element. 
Aggravated burglary always requires proof that the 
defendant entered or remained in a building; 
aggravated robbery always requires proof that the 
defendant took another's property. Because the 
unique element of each crime will always require 
proof beyond that needed for proof of the bare 
elements of the other crime, Hill 's first test is 
sufficient to demonstrate that no lesser included 
relationship can exist between these crimes. 
Brooks argues that Bradley supports his contention 
that aggravated robbery is a lesser included offense 
of aggravated burglary. Bradley is clearly 
distinguishable because it involved charges of 
aggravated burglary, on the one hand, and 
aggravated assault (not aggravated robbery), on the 
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other. Bradley, 752 P.2d at 877-78. Because 
aggravated assault has completely different 
elements from aggravated robbery, the fact that 
Bradley concluded that in some factual situations, 
aggravated burglary and aggravated assault might 
entail a lesser included relationship does not further 
our analysis here. 
Because we find no error in Brooks' conviction of 
both aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery, 
we need not address whether Brooks' lesser 
included argument is reviewable under an 
ineffective assistance of counsel analysis. 
Affirmed. 
DURHAM, J., and GLASMANN, Judge, concur in 
Chief Justice ZIMMERMAN'S opinion. 
STEWART, Associate C.J., and HOWE, J., concur 
in the result. 
Having disqualified himself, RUSSON, J., does not 
participate herein; MICHAEL J. GLASMANN, 
District Judge, sat. 
Utah, 1995. 
State v. Brooks 
908 P.2d 856 
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